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Abstract
Transactional memory (TM) facilitates the development of
concurrent applications by letting the programmer desig-
nate certain code blocks as atomic. Programmers using a
TM often would like to access the same data both inside
and outside transactions, e.g., to improve performance or
to support legacy code. In this case, programmers would
ideally like the TM to guarantee strong atomicity, where
transactions can be viewed as executing atomically also with
respect to non-transactional accesses. Since guaranteeing
strong atomicity for arbitrary programs is prohibitively ex-
pensive, researchers have suggested guaranteeing it only for
certain data-race free (DRF) programs, particularly those that
follow the privatization idiom: from some point on, threads
agree that a given object can be accessed non-transactionally.
Supporting privatization safely in a TM is nontrivial, because
this often requires correctly inserting transactional fences,
which wait until all active transactions complete.
Unfortunately, there is currently no consensus on a sin-
gle denition of transactional DRF, in particular, because
no existing notion of DRF takes into account transactional
fences. In this paper we propose such a notion and prove
that, if a TM satises a certain condition generalizing opacity
and a program using it is DRF assuming strong atomicity,
then the program indeed has strongly atomic semantics. We
show that our DRF notion allows the programmer to use
privatization idioms. We also propose a method for proving
our generalization of opacity and apply it to the TL2 TM.
CCS Concepts • Theory of computation → Concur-
rency; • Software and its engineering→ Software ver-
ication;
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1 Introduction
Transactional memory (TM) facilitates the development of
concurrent applications by letting the programmer designate
certain code blocks as atomic [22]. TM allows developing
a program and reasoning about its correctness as if each
atomic block executes as a transaction—atomically and with-
out interleaving with other blocks—even though in reality
the blocks can be executed concurrently. This guarantee can
be formalized as observational renement [7]: every behavior
a user can observe of a program using a TM implementation
can also be observed when the program uses an abstract
TM that executes each block atomically. A TM can be imple-
mented in hardware [23, 27], software [38] or a combination
of both [11, 25].
Often programmers using a TM would like to access the
same data both inside and outside transactions. This may be
desirable to avoid performance overheads of transactional
accesses, to support legacy code, or for explicit memory
deallocation. One typical pattern is privatization [40], il-
lustrated in Figure 1(a). There the atomic blocks return
a value signifying whether the transaction committed or
aborted. In the program, an object x is guarded by a ag
x_is_private, showing whether the object should be ac-
cessed transactionally (false) or non-transactionally (true).
The left-hand-side thread rst tries to set the ag inside
transaction T1, thereby privatizing x. If successful, it then
accesses x non-transactionally. A concurrent transaction T2
in the right-hand-side thread checks the ag x_is_private
prior to accessing x, to avoid simultaneous transactional and
non-transactional access to the object. We expect the post-
condition shown to hold: if privatization is successful, at the
end of the program x should store 1, not 42. The opposite id-
iom is publication, illustrated in Figure 2. The left-hand-side
thread writes to x non-transactionally and then clears the
ag x_is_private inside transaction T1, thereby publishing
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(a) Delayed commit problem:
{ x_is_private = false ∧ x = 0 }
l := atomic { // T1
x_is_private = true;
}
if (l == committed)
x = 1; // ν
atomic { // T2
if (!x_is_private) {
x = 42;
}
}
{ l = committed =⇒ x = 1 }
(b) Doomed transaction problem:
{ x_is_private = false ∧ x = 0 }
l := atomic { // T1
x_is_private = true;
}
if (l == committed)
x = 1; // ν
atomic { // T2
if (!x_is_private) {
while (x == 1) {}
}
}
Figure 1. Privatization examples.
{ x_is_private = true ∧ x = l = 0 }
x := 42; // ν
l1 := atomic { // T1
x_is_private = false;
}
l2 := atomic { // T2
if (!x_is_private)
l = x;
}
{ l2 = committed ∧ l , 0 =⇒ l = 42 }
Figure 2. Publication example.
{ x = y = l1 = l2 = 0 }
l := atomic { // T
x := 1;
y := 2;
}
l1 := x; // ν1
l2 := y; // ν2
{ x = l1 =⇒ y = l2 }
Figure 3. A racy example.
x. The right-hand-side thread tests the ag inside transaction
T2, and if it is cleared, reads x. Again, we expect the postcon-
dition to hold: if the right-hand-side thread sees the write
to the ag, it should also see the write to x. The two idioms
can be combined: the programmer may privatize an object,
then access it non-transactionally, and then publish it back
for transactional access.
Ideally, programmers mixing transactional and non-
transactional accesses to objects would like the TM to guaran-
tee strong atomicity [21], where transactions can be viewed as
executing atomically also with respect to non-transactional
accesses, i.e., without interleaving with them. This is equiva-
lent to considering every non-transactional access as a single-
instruction transaction. For example, the program in Figure 3
under strongly atomic semantics can only produce execu-
tions where each of the non-transactional accesses ν1 and ν2
executes either before or after the transaction T , so that the
postcondition in Figure 3 always holds.
Unfortunately, providing strong atomicity in software re-
quires instrumenting non-transactional accesses with addi-
tional instructions for maintaining TMmetadata. This under-
mines scalability and makes it dicult to reuse legacy code.
Since most existing TMs are either software-based or rely
on a software fall-back, they do not perform such instrumen-
tation and, hence, provide weaker atomicity guarantees. For
example, they may allow the program in Figure 3 to execute
non-transactional accesses ν1 and ν2 between transactional
writes to x and y and, thus, observe an intermediate state
of the transaction, e.g., x = 1 and y = 0, which violates the
postcondition in Figure 3.
Researchers have suggested resolving the tension between
strong TM semantics and performance by taking inspiration
from non-transactional shared-memory models, which are
subject to the same problem: optimizations performed by
processors and compilers weaken the guarantee of sequential
consistency [26] ideal for this setting. The compromise taken
is to guarantee sequential consistency for certain data-race
free (DRF) programs, which do not access the same data con-
currently without synchronization [6]. Racy programs either
are allowed to produce non-sequentially-consistent behav-
iors [29], or are declared faulty and thus having no semantics
at all [2]. DRF thus establishes a contract between the pro-
grammer and the run-time system, which can be formalized
by the so-called Fundamental Property: if a program is DRF
assuming the strong semantics (such as sequential consis-
tency), then the program does have the strong semantics.
The crucial feature of this property is that DRF is checked
by considering only executions under the strong semantics,
which relieves the programmer from having to reason about
the weaker semantics of unrestricted programs. The DRF
contract has formed the basis of the memory models of both
Java [29] and C/C++ [2].
Applying the above approach to TM, strong atomicity
would be guaranteed only for programs that do not have an
analog of data races in this setting—informally, concurrent
transactional and non-transactional accesses to the same
data [4, 5, 8, 9, 33, 40]. For example, we do not want to
guarantee strong atomicity for the program in Figure 3,
which has such concurrent accesses to x and y. On the
other hand, the programs in Figure 1 and Figure 2 should be
guaranteed strong atomicity, since at any point of time, an
object is accessed either only transactionally or only non-
transactionally. Unfortunately, whereas the DRF contract
in non-transactional memory models has been worked out
in detail, the situation in transactional models remains un-
settled. There is currently no consensus on a single de-
nition of transactional DRF: there are multiple competing
proposals [4, 8, 9, 24, 28], which often come without a formal
justication similar to the Fundamental Property of non-
transactional memory models.
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This paper makes a step towards a denition of trans-
actional DRF on a par with solutions in non-transactional
memory models. A key technical challenge we tackle is
that many TM implementations, when used out-of-the-
box, do not guarantee strong atomicity for seemingly well-
behaved programs using privatization, such as the ones in
Figure 1 [12, 15, 30, 37]. For example, such TMs may invali-
date the postcondition of the program in Figure 1(a) due to
the delayed commit problem [40]. In more detail, many soft-
ware TM implementations execute transactions optimisti-
cally, buering their writes, and ush them to memory only
on commit. In this case, it is possible for the transactionT1 to
privatize x and for ν to modify it afterT2 started committing,
but before its write to x reached the memory, so that T2’s
write subsequently overwrites ν ’s write and violates the post-
condition. TMs that make transactional updates in-place and
undo them on abort are subject to a similar problem. In Fig-
ure 1(b) we give another privatization example that is prone
to a dierent problem—the doomed transaction problem [40].
A TM may execute T2’s read from x_is_private, and then
T1 and ν . Because T1 modies x_is_private, at this point
T2 is “doomed”, i.e., guaranteed to abort if it nishes execut-
ing. But if the non-transactional write ν is uninstrumented
and ignores the metadata the TM maintains to ensure the
consistency of reads, T2 will read the value written to x by ν
and enter an innite loop. This would never happen under
strong atomicity, where T1 and ν may not execute while T2
is running.
A possible solution to the above problems is for the
compiler or the programmer to insert special transactional
fences [40]. These have semantics similar to read-copy-update
(RCU) [31]: a fence blocks until all the transactions that were
active when it was invoked complete, by either committing
or aborting. For example, assume we insert a fence between
the transaction T1 and the non-transactional access ν in Fig-
ure 1(a). Then the delayed commit problem does not arise:
if T2 enters the if body and writes to x, then it must begin
before the fence does; thus the fence will wait until T2 com-
pletes and ushes its write to memory, so that T2 cannot
incorrectly overwrite ν . Analogously, a fence between T1
and ν in Figure 1(b) ensures that the doomed transaction
problem does not arise: if T2 reaches the while loop, then ν
cannot execute before T2 nishes, and thus the while loop
immediately terminates.
Unfortunately, inserting transactional fences conserva-
tively after every transaction, even when not required, un-
dermines scalability. For example, Yoo et al. [42] showed
that unnecessarily fencing a selection of transactional bench-
marks leads to overheads of 32% on average and 107% in the
worst case, the latter on one of the STAMP benchmarks [32].
For this reason, researchers have suggested placing trans-
actional fences selectively, e.g., according to programmer
annotations [42]. However, omitting fences without violat-
ing strong atomicity is nontrivial: for example, for several
years the TM implementation in the GCC compiler had a
buggy placement of transactional fences that omitted them
after read-only transactions; this has recently been shown to
violate strong atomicity [43]. To make sure such bugs are not
habitual, we need a notion of transactional DRF that would
take into account selective fence placements.
In this paper we propose just such a notion and formalize
its Fundamental Property using observational renement:
if a program is DRF under strong atomicity (formalized as
transactional sequential consistency [8, 9]), then all its exe-
cutions are observationally equivalent to strongly atomic
ones. We furthermore prove that the Fundamental Property
holds under a certain condition on the TM, generalizing opac-
ity [19, 20], which we call strong opacity. Thus, similarly to
non-transactional memory models, the programmer writing
code that has no data races according to our notion never
needs to reason about weakly atomic semantics.
Our results thus establish a contract between client pro-
grams and TM implementations sucient for strong atom-
icity. Of course, for this contract to be useful, it should not
overconstrain either of its participants: programmers should
be able to use the typical programming idioms, and common
TM implementations should satisfy strong opacity that we
require. In this paper we argue that this is indeed the case.
On the client side, our DRF notion allows the programmer
to use privatization and publication idioms—programs in
Figure 2 and in Figure 1 with a fence between T1 and ν are
considered data-race free and thus guaranteed strong atom-
icity. We hence view privatization and publication idioms as
just particular ways of ensuring data-race freedom.
To justify appropriateness of our requirements on TM
systems, we develop a method for proving that a TM satises
strong opacity for DRF programs. Our method is modular: it
requires only a minimal adjustment to a proof of the usual
opacity of the TM assuming no mixed transactional/non-
transactional accesses. We demonstrate the eectiveness of
the method by applying it to prove the strong opacity of a
realistic TM, TL2 [12], enhanced with transactional fences
implemented using RCU. Our proof shows that this TM will
indeed guarantee strong atomicity to programs satisfying
our notion of DRF.
Thus, this paper makes the rst proposal of transactional
DRF that considers a exible programmingmodel (with trans-
actional fences) and comes with a formal justication of its
appropriateness—the Fundamental Property and the notion
of TM correctness required for it to hold.
2 Programming Language
We now introduce a simple programming language with
mixed transactional/non-transactional accesses, for which
we formalize our results. We also dene the semantics of
the language when using a given TM implementation. As a
special case of this semantics, we get the notion of strong
PPoPP ’18, February 24–28, 2018, Vienna, Austria Artem Khyzha, Hagit Aiya, Alexey Gotsman, and Noam Rinetzky
atomicity [21] (also called transactional sequential consis-
tency [8]): this is obtained by instantiating our semantics
with a special idealized atomic TM where the execution of
transactions does not interleave with that of other transac-
tions or with non-transactional accesses.
2.1 Programming Language Syntax
A program P = C1 ‖ . . . ‖ CN in our language is a parallel
composition of commands Ct executed by dierent threads
t ∈ ThreadID = {1, . . . ,N }. Every thread t ∈ ThreadID has
a set of local variables l ∈ LVart , which only it can access; for
simplicity, we assume that these are integer-valued. Threads
have access to a transactional memory (TM), which manages
a xed collection of shared register objects x ∈ Reg. The
syntax of commands C ∈ Com is as follows:
C = c | C ; C | if (b) then C else C | while (b) do C
| l := atomic {C} | l := x .read() | x .write(e ) | fence
where b and e denote Boolean, respectively, integer expres-
sions over local variables and constants. The language in-
cludes primitive commands c ∈ PComm, which operate on
local variables, and standard control-ow constructs.
An atomic block l := atomic {C} executes C as a trans-
action, which the TM can commit or abort. The system’s
decision is returned in the local variable l , which gets as-
signed a distinguished value commied or aborted. We do
not allow programs to abort a transaction explicitly, and
forbid nested atomic blocks and, hence, nested transactions.
Commands can invoke twomethods on a shared register x :
x .read() returns the current value of x , and x .write(e ) sets
it to e . Threads may call these methods both inside and out-
side atomic blocks. We refer to the former as a transactional
accesses and to the latter as a non-transactional accesses. To
make our presentation more approachable, following [20]
we assume that each write in a single program execution
writes a distinct value. Finally, the language includes a trans-
actional fence command fence, which acts as explained in
§1. It may only be used outside transactions.
The simplicity of the above language allows us to clearly
explain our contributions. We leave handling advanced fea-
tures, such as nested transactions [34, 35] and nested syn-
chronization [39] as future work.
2.2 A Trace-based Model of Computations
To dene the semantics of our programming language, we
need a formal model for program computations. To this end,
we introduce traces—certain nite sequences of actions, each
describing a single computation step (for simplicity, in this
paper we consider only nite computations). Let ActionId be
a set of action identiers. Actions are of two kinds. A primitive
action denotes the execution of a primitive command and
is of the form (a, t , c ), where a ∈ ActionId, t ∈ ThreadID
and c ∈ PComm. A TM interface action has one of the forms
shown in Figure 4. We use α to range over actions.
Request actions Matching response actions
(a, t , txbegin) (a, t , ok) | (a, t , aborted)
(a, t , txcommit) (a, t , commied) | (a, t , aborted)
(a, t ,write(x ,v )) (a, t , ret(⊥)) | (a, t , aborted)
(a, t , read(x )) (a, t , ret(v )) | (a, t , aborted)
(a, t , fbegin) (a, t , fend)
Figure 4. TM interface actions. Here a ∈ ActionId, t ∈
ThreadID, x ∈ Reg, and v ∈ Z.
TM interface actions denote the control ow of a thread t
crossing the boundary between the program and the TM:
request actions correspond to the control being transferred
from the former to the latter, and response actions, the other
way around. A txbegin action is generated upon entering
an atomic block, and a txcommit action when a transaction
tries to commit upon exiting an atomic block. The request
actions write(x ,v ) and read(x ) denote invocations of the
write, respectively, read methods of register x ; a write
action is annotated with the value v written. The response
actions ret(⊥) and ret(v ) denote the return from invocations
of write, respectively, read methods of a register; the latter
is annotated with the value v read. For reasons explained
below, we consider non-transactional accesses to registers
as calling into the TM, and hence use the same actions for
them as for transactional accesses. The TM may abort a
transaction (but not a non-transactional access) at any point
when it is in control; this is recorded by an aborted response
action. The actions fbegin and fend denote the beginning,
respectively, the end of the execution of a fence command.
In the following _ denotes an irrelevant expression.
Denition 2.1. A trace τ is a nite sequence of actions satis-
fying certain well-formedness conditions (stated informally
due to space constraints; see §A.1):
• every action in τ has a unique identier;
• commands in actions executed by a thread t do not access
local variables of other threads t ′ , t ;
• every write operation writes a unique value distinct from
vinit (the initial value of each register);
• for every thread t , the projection τ |t of τ onto the actions
by t cannot contain a request action immediately followed
by a primitive action;
• request and response actions are properly matched;
• actions denoting the beginning and the end of transactions
are properly matched;
• non-transactional accesses execute atomically: if τ =
τ1 α τ2, whereα is a read or awrite request action by thread
t , and all the transactions of t in τ1 completed, then τ2 be-
gins with a response to α .
• non-transactional accesses never abort;
• fence actions may not occur inside transactions; and
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• fence blocks until all active transactions complete:
if τ = τ1 (_, t , txbegin) τ2 (_, t ′, fbegin) τ3 (_, t ′, fend) τ4
then either τ2 or τ3 contains an action of the form
(_, t , commied) or (_, t , aborted).
We denote the set of traces by Trace and the set of actions
in a trace τ by act(τ ). For a trace τ = τ0_, where τ0 is also a
trace, we say that τ0 is a prex of τ .
A transaction T is a nonempty trace such that it contains
actions by the same thread, begins with a txbegin action and
only its last action can be a commied or an aborted action.
A transaction T is: committed if it ends with a commied
action, aborted if it ends with aborted, commit-pending if it
ends with txcommit, and live, in all other cases. A transaction
T is in a trace τ if T is a subsequence of τ and no longer
transaction is. We let txns(τ ) be the set of transactions in τ .
We refer to TM interface actions in a trace outside of a
transaction as non-transactional actions. We call a matching
request/response pair of a read or a write a non-transactional
access. We denote by nontxn(τ ) the set of non-transactional
accesses in τ and range over them by ν .
A history is a trace containing only TM interface actions;
we use H , S to range over histories. Since histories fully cap-
ture the possible interactions between a TM and a client
program, we often conate the notion of a TM and the set
of histories it produces. Hence, a transactional memory H
is a set of histories that is prex-closed and closed under re-
naming action identiers. Note that histories include actions
corresponding to non-transactional accesses, even though
these may not be directly managed by the TM implemen-
tation. This is needed to account for changes to registers
performed by such actions when dening the TM semantics:
e.g., in the case when a register is privatized, modied non-
transactionally and then published back for transactional
access. Of course, a well-formed TM semantics should not
impose restrictions on the placement of non-transactional
actions, since these are under the control of the program.
2.3 Programming Language Semantics
The semantics of the programming language is the set of
traces that computations of programs produce. Due to space
constraints, we defer its formal denition to §A.2 and de-
scribe only its high-level structure. A state of a program
P = C1 ‖ . . . ‖ CN records the values of all its variables:
s ∈ State = (⊎Nt=1 LVart ) → Z. The semantics of a pro-
gram P is given by the set of traces JP ,H K(s ) ⊆ Trace
it produces when executed with a TM H from an initial
state s . To dene this set, we rst dene the set of tracesJPK(s ) ⊆ Trace that a program can produce when executed
from s with the behavior of the TM unrestricted, i.e., con-
sidering all possible values the TM can return on reads and
allowing transactions to commit or abort arbitrarily. This
denition follows the intuitive semantics of our program-
ming language. We then restrict JPK(s ) to the set of traces
produced by P when executed with H by selecting those
traces that interact with the TM in a way consistent with
H : JP ,H K(s ) = {τ | τ ∈ JPK(s ) ∧ history(τ ) ∈ H }, where
history(·) projects to TM interface actions.
2.4 Strong Atomicity
We now dene an idealized atomic TM Hatomic where the
execution of transactions does not interleave with that of
other transactions or with non-transactional accesses. By
instantiating the semantics of §2.3 with this TM,we formalize
the strongly atomic semantics [21] (transactional sequential
consistency [8, 9]).Hatomic contains only histories that are
non-interleaved, i.e., where actions by one transaction do
not overlap with the actions of another transaction or of
non-transactional accesses. Note that by denition actions
pertaining to dierent non-transactional accesses cannot
interleave. Note also that transactions in a non-interleaved
history do not have to be complete. For example,
H0 = (_, t1, txbegin) (_, t1, ok) (_, t1,write(x , 1)) (_, t1, ret(⊥))
(_, t1, txcommit) (_, t2, txbegin) (_, t2, ok) (_, t2,write(x , 2))
(_, t3, read(x )) (_, t3, ret(1))
is non-interleaved.We have to allow such histories inHatomic,
because they may be produced by programs in our language,
e.g., due to a non-terminating loop inside an atomic block.
We dene Hatomic in such a way that the changes made
by a live or aborted transaction are invisible to other trans-
actions. However, there is no such certainty in the treatment
of a commit-pending transaction: the TM implementation
might have already reached a point at which it is decided that
the transaction will commit. Then the transaction is eec-
tively committed, and its operations may aect other trans-
actions [20]. To account for this, when deningHatomic we
consider every possible completion of each commit-pending
transaction in a history to either committed or an aborted
one. Formally, we say that a history H c is a completion of
a non-interleaved history H if: (i) H c is non-interleaved;
(ii) H c is has no commit-pending transactions; (iii) H is a
subsequence of H c ; and (iv) any action in H c which is not in
H is either a commied or an aborted action. For example,
we can obtain a completion of history H0 above by inserting
(_, t1, commied) after (_, t1, txcommit).
We deneHatomic as the set of all non-interleaved histories
H that have a completionH c where every response action of
a read(x ) returns the valuev in the last precedingwrite(x ,v )
action that is not located in an aborted or live transaction
dierent from the one of the read; if there is no such write,
the read should return the initial value vinit. For example,
H0 ∈ Hatomic. Hence, Hatomic denes the intuitive atomic
semantics of transactions.
3 Data-Race Freedom
A data race happens between a pair of conicting actions, as
dened below.
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Denition 3.1. A non-transactional request action α and a
transactional request action α ′ conict if α and α ′ are exe-
cuted by dierent threads and they are read or write actions
on the same register, with at least one being a write.
For such actions to form a data race, they should be concur-
rent. As is standard, we formalize this using a happens-before
relation on actions in a history: hb(H ) ⊆ act(H ) × act(H ).
To streamline explanations, we rst dene DRF in terms of
happens-before, and only after this dene the latter. For a
history H and an index i , let H (i ) denote the i-th action in
the sequence H .
Denition 3.2. ActionsH (i ) andH (j ) in a historyH form a
data race, if they conict and are not related by hb(H ) either
way. A history H is data-race free (DRF), written DRF(H ), if
it has no data races.
Denition 3.3. A program P is data-race free (DRF) when
executed from a state s with a TMH, written DRF(P , s,H),
if ∀τ ∈ JPK(H, s ).DRF(history(τ )).
Our goal is to enable programmers to ensure strong atom-
icity of a program by checking its data-race freedom. How-
ever, the notion of DRF depends on the TMH, and we do not
want the programmer to have to reason about the actual TM
implementation. In Section 5, we give conditions on TMH
under which strong atomicity of a program is guaranteed if it
is DRF assuming strong atomicity, i.e., DRF(P , s,Hatomic) for
Hatomic from §2.4. We next dene hb(H ) and show examples
of programs that are racy and race-free underHatomic.
For a history H , we dene several relations over act(H ),
which we explain in the following:
• execution order: α <H α ′ i
for some i, j we have α = H (i ), α ′ = H (j ) and i < j.
• per-thread order po(H ): α <po(H ) α ′ i
α <H α
′ and actions α and α ′ are by the same thread.
• restricted per-thread order xpo(H ): α <xpo(H ) α ′ i
α <H α
′, actions α and α ′ are by the same thread t , and
there is a (_, t , txbegin) action between α and α ′.
• client order cl(H ): α <cl(H ) α ′ i
α <H α
′ and α ,α ′ are non-transactional in H .
• after-fence order af (H ): α <af (H ) α ′ i
α <H α
′, α = (_, _, fbegin) and α ′ = (_, _, txbegin), i.e.,
the transaction begins after the fence does (Figure 5(a)).
• before-fence order bf (H ): α <bf (H ) α ′ i
α <H α
′, α ∈ {(_, _, commied), (_, _, aborted)} and
α ′ = (_, _, fend), i.e., the transaction ends before the fence
does (Figure 5(b)).
• read-dependency relation wrx (H ) for x ∈ Reg1:
α <wrx (H ) α
′ i α = (_, _,write(x ,v )), α ′ = (_, _, ret(v ))
and the matching request action for α ′ is (_, _, read(x )).
1The notation wr, standing for “write-to-read”, is chosen to mirror other
kinds of dependencies introduced in §6.
fence
T
α
α ′af
T
fence
α
α ′
bf
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Illustration of the fence relations.
{ x_is_ready = false ∧ x = 0 }
l1 := atomic { // T
x = 42;
}
x_is_ready := true; // ν
do {
l2 := x_is_ready; // ν ′
} while (¬l2);
int l3 := x; // ν ′′
{ l1 = committed =⇒ l3 = 42 }
Figure 6. Privatization by agreement outside transactions.
• transactional read-dependency relation txwrx (H ):
α <txwrx (H ) α
′ i α <wrx (H ) α ′, and α and α ′ are transac-
tional.
Denition 3.4. For a history H we let the happens-before
relation of H be
hb(H ) = (po(H ) ∪ cl(H ) ∪ af (H ) ∪ bf (H ) ∪⋃
x ∈Reg (xpo(H ) ; txwrx (H )))+.
Components of the happens-before describe various forms
of synchronization available in our programming language,
which we now explain one by one. First, actions by the
same thread cannot be concurrent, and thus, we let po(H ) ⊆
hb(H ). To concentrate on issues related to TM, in this pa-
per we do not consider the integration of transactions into
a language with a weak memory model and assume that
the underlying non-transactional memory is sequentially
consistent. Hence, we do not consider pairs of concurrent
non-transactional accesses as races and let cl(H ) ⊆ hb(H ).
This can be used to privatize an object by agreeing on its
status outside transactions, as illustrated in Figure 6. There
the left-hand-side thread writes to x inside a transaction and
then sets the ag x_is_ready outside. The right-hand-side
thread keeps reading the ag non-transactionally until it is
set, and then reads x non-transactionally. This program is
DRF underHatomic because, in any of its traces, the conict-
ing write inT and the non-transactional read ν ′′ are ordered
in happens-before due to the client order between the write
in ν and the read in ν ′ that causes the do loop to terminate.
We also have xpo(H ) ; txwrx (H ) ⊆ hb(H ). Intuitively,
this is because, if we have (α ,α ′) ∈ txwrx (H ), then the com-
mands by the thread of α preceding the transaction of α are
guaranteed to have taken eect by the time α ′ executes.2
2Note, however, that the commands preceding α in its transaction may
not have taken eect by this time: the TM may ush the writes of the
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This ensures that publication can be done safely, as we now
illustrate by showing that the program in Figure 2 is DRF
underHatomic. Traces of the program may have only a sin-
gle pair of conicting actions—the accesses to x in ν and T2.
For both conicting actions to occur, T2 has to read false
from x_is_private. Since underHatomic transactions do not
interleave with other transactions or non-transactional ac-
cesses, for thisT1 has to execute beforeT2, yielding a history
of the form νT1T2. In this history, we have a read-dependency
between the write to x_is_private in T1 and the read from
x_is_private in T2. But then the write to x in ν happens
before the read from x in T2, so that these actions cannot
form a race.
Relations af (H ) and bf (H ) are used to formalize synchro-
nization ensured by transactional fences. Recall that a fence
blocks until all active transactions complete, by either com-
mitting or aborting. Hence, every transaction either begins
after the fence does (and thus the fence does not need to wait
for it; Figure 5(a)) or ends (including any required clean-up)
before the fence does (Figure 5(b)). The relations af (H ) and
bf (H ) capture the two respective cases. Note that, as required
by Denition 2.1, every transaction has to be related to a
fence at least by one of the two relations: a transaction may
not span a fence.
Including after-fence and before-fence relations into
happens-before ensures that privatization can be done safely
given an appropriate placement of fences. To illustrate this,
we show that the programs in Figure 1 are DRF under
Hatomic when we place a transactional fence between T1
and ν . The possible conicts are between the accesses to x in
ν and T2. For a conict to occur, T2 has to read false from
x_is_private. Then T2 has to execute before T1, yielding a
history H of the form T2T1α1α2ν , where α1 and α2 denote
the request and the response actions of the fence. Since T2
occurs before α2 in the history, they are related by the before-
fence relation. But then the accesses to x inT2 happen-before
the write in ν and, therefore, the conicting actions do not
form a race. Finally, the program in Figure 3 is racy, since
its traces contain pairs of conicting actions unordered in
happens-before. Inserting fences into this program will not
make it DRF.
Our notion of DRF under Hatomic establishes the condi-
tion that a program has to satisfy to be guaranteed strong
atomicity. In the next section, we formulate the obligations
of its TM counterpart in the DRF contract.
4 Strong Opacity
We state the requirements on a TMH by generalizing the
notion of opacity [19, 20], yieldingwhat we call strong opacity.
As part of our denition, we require that a historyH of a TM
H can be matched by a history S of the atomic TMHatomic
transaction to the memory in any order. This is why we do not require
txwrx (H ) ⊆ hb(H ).
that “looks similar” toH from the perspective of the program.
The similarity is formalized by the following relation H ⊑ S ,
which requires S to be a permutation of H preserving the
happens-before relation.
Denition 4.1. A historyH1 is in the strong opacity relation
with a history H2, written H1 ⊑ H2, if there is a bijection
θ : {1, . . . , |H1 |} → {1, . . . , |H2 |} such that:
• ∀i .H1 (i ) = H2 (θ (i )), and
• ∀i, j . i < j ∧ H1 (i ) <hb(H1 ) H2 (j ) =⇒ θ (i ) < θ (j ).
The original denition of opacity requires any history of a
TMH to have a matching history of the atomic TMHatomic.
However, such a requirement would be too strong for our
setting: since the TM has no control over non-transactional
actions of its clients, histories in H may be racy, and we
do not want to require the TM to guarantee strong atom-
icity in such cases. Hence, our denition of strong opacity
requires only DRF histories to have justications inHatomic.
LetH |DRF = {H ∈ H | DRF(H )}.
Denition 4.2. A TM H is strongly opaque, written
H |DRF ⊑ Hatomic, if
∀H .H ∈ H |DRF =⇒ ∃S . S ∈ Hatomic ∧ H ⊑ S .
Apart from the restriction to DRF histories, strong opac-
ity and the usual opacity dier in several other ways.
First, unlike in the usual opacity, our histories include non-
transactional actions, because these can aect the behav-
ior of the TM (e.g., via the idiom of “privatize, modify non-
transactionally, publish”, §2.2). Second, instead of preserv-
ing happens-before hb(H1) in Denition 4.1, the usual opac-
ity requires preserving the program order po(H1) and the
following real-time order rt(H1) on actions: α <rt(H ) α i
α ∈ {(_, _, commied), (_, _, aborted)}, α ′ = (_, _, txbegin)
and α <H α ′. This orders non-overlapping transactions,
with the duration of a transaction determined by the interval
from its txbegin action to the corresponding commied or
aborted action (or to the end of the history if there is none).
As shown in [16], preserving real-time order is unnecessary
if program threads do not have means of communication
not reected in histories. Since we record the actions using
both transactional and non-transactional accesses, preserv-
ing real-time order is unnecessary for our results. However,
we use this order to prove strong opacity by adjusting the
proofs of the usual one (§6). Finally, preserving happens-
before in Denition 4.1 is required so that we could check
DRF assuming strong atomicity, as we explain next.
5 The Fundamental Property
We now formalize the Fundamental Property of our DRF
notion using observational renement [7]: if a program is
DRF under the atomic TMHatomic, then any trace of the pro-
gram under a strongly opaque TMH has an observationally
equivalent trace under the atomic TMHatomic.
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Denition 5.1. Traces τ and τ ′ are observationally equiva-
lent, denoted by τ ∼ τ ′, if
(∀t ∈ ThreadID. τ |t = τ ′ |t ) ∧ (τ |nontx = τ ′ |nontx),
where τ |nontx denotes the subsequence of τ containing all
actions from non-transactional accesses.
Equivalent traces are considered indistinguishable to the
user. In particular, the sequences of non-transactional ac-
cesses in equivalent traces (which usually include all input-
output) satisfy the same linear-time temporal properties. We
lift the equivalence to sets of traces as follows.
Denition 5.2. A set of traces T observationally renes a
set of traces T ′, written T  T ′, if ∀τ ∈ T . ∃τ ′ ∈ T ′. τ ∼ τ ′.
Theorem 5.3 (Fundamental Property). If H is a TM such
thatH |DRF ⊑ Hatomic, then
∀P , s .DRF(P , s,Hatomic) =⇒ JPK(H , s )  JPK(Hatomic, s ).
Theorem 5.3 establishes a contract between the program-
mer and the TM implementors. The TM implementor has
to ensure strong opacity of the TM assuming the program
is DRF: H |DRF ⊑ Hatomic. The programmer has to en-
sure the DRF of the program assuming strong atomicity:
DRF(P , s,Hatomic). This contract lets the programmer to
check properties of a program assuming strong atomicity
(JPK(Hatomic, s )) and get the guarantee that the properties
hold when the program uses the actual TM implementa-
tion (JPK(H , s )). We have already shown that the expected
privatization and publication idioms are DRF under strong
atomicity (§3), so that the programmer can satisfy its part of
the contract. In the following sections we develop a method
for discharging the obligations of the TM.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 follows directly from the fol-
lowing lemma, proved in §B.1.
Lemma 5.4. IfH is a TM such thatH |DRF ⊑ Hatomic, then:
1. ∀P , s .DRF(P , s,H ) =⇒ JPK(H , s )  JPK(Hatomic, s ).
2. ∀P , s .DRF(P , s,Hatomic) =⇒ DRF(P , s,H ).
Part 1 shows that if a program is DRF under the concrete
TMH , then it has the expected strongly atomic semantics. It
is an adaptation of a result from [7]. Part 2 enables checking
DRF using an atomic TMHatomic and is a contribution of the
present paper. Its proof relies on the fact that strong opacity
preserves happens-before (Denition 4.1).
6 Proving Strong Opacity
We now develop a method for proving H |DRF ⊑ Hatomic.
The method builds on a graph characterization of opacity
of Guerraoui and Kapalka [20], which was proposed for
proving the usual opacity of TMs that do not allow mixed
transactional/non-transactional accesses to the same data.
The characterization allows checking opacity of a history by
checking two properties: consistency of the history and the
acyclicity of a certain opacity graph, which we dene further
in this section.
Consistency captures some very basic properties of read-
dependency relation wrx (for each register x) that have to
be satised by every opaque TM history. Intuitively, in a
consistent history every transaction T reading the value of
a register x either reads the latest value T itself wrote to x
before, or some value written non-transactionally or by a
committed or commit-pending transaction.
Denition 6.1. A pair of matching request and response
actions (α ,α ′) is said to be local to T ∈ txns(H ), if:
• α = (_, _, read(x )) ∧
∃β ∈ T . β <po(H ) α ∧ β = (_, _,write(x , _)); or
• α = (_, _,write(x , _)) ∧
∃β ∈ T . α <po(H ) β ∧ β = (_, _,write(x , _)).
We let local(H ) denote the set of all local actions in H .
Thus, local reads from x are preceded by a write to x in the
same transaction; local writes to x are followed by a write
to x in the same transaction.
Denition 6.2. In a history H , a read request α =
(_, _, read(x )) and its matching response α ′ = (_, _, ret(v ))
are said to be consistent, if:
• when (α ,α ′) ∈ local(H ) and performed by a transac-
tion T , v is the value written by the most recent write
(_, _,write(x ,v )) preceding the read in T ;
• when (α ,α ′) < local(H ), either there exists a non-local
β not located in an aborted or live transaction such
that β <wrx (H ) α ′, or there is no such β and v = vinit.
We also say that a history H is consistent, written cons(H ),
if all of its matching read requests and responses are.
We now present the denition of an opacity graph of a
history with mixed transactional/non-transactional accesses.
Denition 6.3. The opacity graph of a history H is a tuple
G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW), where:
• N = txns(H ) ∪ nontxn(H ) is the set of nodes.
• vis ⊆ N is a visibility predicate, such that it holds of all
non-transactional accesses and committed transactions
and does not hold of all aborted and live transactions.
• HB ∈ P (N × N ) is such that
n
HB−−→ n′ ⇐⇒ ∃α ∈ n,α ′ ∈ n′. α <hb(H ) α ′.
• WR ∈ Reg → P (N × N ) species read-dependency rela-
tions on nodes: for each x ∈ Reg,
n
WRx−−−→ n′ ⇐⇒ n , n′ ∧ ∃α ∈ n,α ′ ∈ n′. α <wrx (H ) α ′,
where the relation on actions wrx (H ) is dened in §3. We
require that each node that is read from be visible:
∀n,x .n WRx−−−→ _ =⇒ vis(n).
Safe Privatization in Transactional Memory PPoPP ’18, February 24–28, 2018, Vienna, Austria
• WW ∈ Reg→ P (N × N ) species write-dependency rela-
tions, such that for each x ∈ Reg, WWx is an irreexive
total order on {n ∈ N | vis(n) ∧ (_, _,write(x , _)) ∈ n}.
• RW ∈ Reg → P (N × N ) species anti-dependency rela-
tions, computed fromWR andWW as follows:
n
RWx−−−→ n′ ⇐⇒ n , n′ ∧ ((∃n′′.n′′ WWx−−−−→ n′ ∧ n′′ WRx−−−→ n)
∨ (vis(n′) ∧ (_, _,write(x , _)) ∈ n′
∧ (_, _, ret(x ,vinit)) ∈ n)).
We let Graph(H ) denote the set of all opacity graphs of H .
We say that a graph G is acyclic, written acyclic(G ), if edges
from HB,WR,WW and RW do not form a cycle.
The nodes in our opacity graph include transactions and
non-transactional accesses in H . The intention of the vis
predicate is to mark those nodes that have taken eect, in
particular, commit-pending transactions that should be con-
sidered committed (cf. history completions in §2.4). The other
components, intuitively, constrain the order in which the
nodes should go in a sequential history witnessing the strong
opacity ofH . TheHB relation is the lifting of happens-before
to the nodes of the graph. A read-dependency n
WRx−−−→ n′
species when the node n′ reads a value of x written by
another node n. A write-dependency n
WWx−−−−→ n′ species
when n′ overwrites a value of x written by n; for the writes
to take eect, both nodes should be visible. Finally, an anti-
dependency n
RWx−−−→ n′ species when n reads a value of x
overwritten by n′; the initial value vinit of x is considered
overwritten by any write to the register.
The following lemma (proved in §B.2) shows that we can
check strong opacity of a history by checking its consistency
and the acyclicity of its opacity graph. Then the theorem
following from it gives a criterion for the strong opacity of a
TMH .
Lemma 6.4. ∀H . (cons(H ) ∧ ∃G ∈ Graph(H ). acyclic(G))
=⇒ (∃H ′ ∈ Hatomic.H ⊑ H ′).
Theorem 6.5. H ⊑ Hatomic holds, if the following is true:
∀H ∈ H . cons(H ) ∧ ∃G ∈ Graph(H ). acyclic(G).
In comparison to the graph characterization of the usual
opacity [20] for TMs without mixed transactional/non-
transactional accesses, ours is more complex: the graph in-
cludes non-transactional accesses and the acyclicity check
has to take into account the happens-before relation. We
now show that, to prove the strong opacity of a TM using
Theorem 6.5, we need to make only a minimal adjustment to
a proof of its usual opacity using graph characterization. The
latter characterization includes only transactions as nodes
of the graph, and instead of happens-before, considers the
lifting of the real-time order from §4 to transactions: for a
historyH , we let RT(H ) be the relation between transactions
in H such thatT <RT(H ) T ′ i for some α ∈ T and α ′ ∈ T we
have α <rt(H ) α .
In the following we abuse notation and denote byWR also
the relation⋃x ∈RegWRx , and similarly forWW and RW.
Theorem 6.6. Let a history H ∈ HC |DRF and an opacity
graph G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈ Graph(H ) be such
that the relation (HB ; (WR∪WW∪ RW)) is irreexive. IfG
contains a cycle, then it also contains a cycle over transactions
only with edges from RT ∪WR ∪WW ∪ RW.
Thus, the theorem allows us to modularize the proof of the
acyclicity of an opacity graph into: (i) checking the absence of
“small” cycles with a single dependency edge; and (ii) check-
ing the absence of cycles in the projection of the graph to
transactions, with real-time order replacing happens-before.
The latter acyclicity check is exactly the one required in the
graph characterization of the usual opacity [20]. In the next
section, we show how the theorem enables a simple proof of
strong opacity of a realistic TM, TL2 [12].
The proof of the Theorem 6.6 is given in §B.3. Its main idea
lies in the observation that any edge in WR ∪WW ∪ RW,
where one of the endpoints is a transaction and one is a
non-transactional access, yields a pair of conicting actions
in H . Since H is DRF, this means that the nodes are related
by HB one way or another, and the irreexivity of (HB ;
(WR∪WW∪ RW)) means that the dependency edge has to
be covered by HB. Using this, we can transform any cycle in
the graph into one in RT ∪WR ∪WW ∪ RW by replacing
segments of edges involving non-transactional accesses by
the real-time order.
7 Case Study: TL2
The TL2 algorithm. The metadata maintained by the TL2
software TM are summarized in Figure 7. For each register x ,
TL2 maintains its value reg[x], version number ver[x] and
a write-lock lock[x]. New version numbers are generated
with the help of a global counter clock, which transactions
advance on commit. For every thread t , the TM maintains a
ag active[t], which indicates that the thread t is currently
performing a transaction and is used to implement fences.
TL2 also maintains metadata for each transaction T : a read-
set rset[T ] of registersT has read from, a write-set wset[T ]
of registers and values T intends to write to.
For brevity, we only provide pseudocode for transaction
commits and fences, and describe the initialization, read, and
write informally. When a transaction T starts in a thread
t , it sets the ag active[t] to true, and stores the value of
clock into a local variable rver[T ], which determines T ’s
read timestamp: TL2 allows T to read registers only with
versions less than or equal to rver[T ]. The write of a value
v into a register x simply adds the pair (x ,v ) to the write-set
wset[T ].
Each time T performs a read from a register x , it rst
checks if it has already performed a write to x , in which case
it returns that the value for x from the write-set wset[T ].
In other cases, T reads the current value reg[x] and checks
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that its version is less than or equal to rver[T ]; if not, TL2
aborts the transaction.
Upon a commit, the current transaction T executes the
function txcommit in Figure 7. The commit starts by acquir-
ing locks on each register in the write-set wset[T ] (lines 11–
18). Next, T fetches-and-increments the value of clock,
which it stores into wver[T ] and uses as the version for the
new valuesT will write to registers—its write timestamp (line
19). Afterwards, T ensures that each register x in rset[T ]
has not been modied during the execution ofT by checking
that x ’s version ver[x] remains less than or equal to rver[T ]
and that x is not currently locked (lines 20–26). The transac-
tion then proceeds to write to the registers and release the
locks one register at a time (lines 27–30). Finally, T commits.
Upon aborting or committing at lines 18, 26 or 31,T executes
a handler that clears the active[t] ag (not shown in the
code).
We consider a simple implementation of transactional
fences in lines 33–39 (taken from [17]). The implementation
works in two steps: it rst determines which transactions the
fence should wait for by checking and storing their active
ags, and then blocks until the threads performing those
transactions clear their active ags.
Proof overview. Due to space constraints, we only give an
overview of the proof of the strong opacity of TL2. To gen-
erate the set HTL2 of all histories of TL2, we consider the
most general client of TL2: a program where every thread
non-deterministically chooses the commands to execute. The
well-formedness conditions on fences from Denition 2.1
can be established with a simple reasoning about the fence
function in lines 33–39 independently from the rest of the
proof. We prove strong opacity using Theorem 6.5: for every
execution of the most general client of TL2 with a DRF his-
tory H , we show that H is consistent and build an opacity
graph. To this end, we only need to dene a visibility relation
vis and write-dependenciesWW, as the other components
of the graph can be computed from these and H .
The consistency proof and the construction of the graph
are inductive in the length of the execution of the most
general client.We start with an empty trace, an empty history
and an empty graph, and extend them as the executions
proceeds. Whenever a non-transactional access ν is executed,
we add a new visible node to the graph. When ν is a write
to a register x , we also append it to the total order WWx .
Whenever a new transactionT starts, we add a corresponding
invisible node. When T executes the txcommit function, if
it reaches line 27, then we are sure T is going to commit. At
this point we therefore we make T visible and append it to
the total orderWWx for each register x ∈ wset[T ].
We need to show that, whenever the graph is extended
with new edges, it stays acyclic. To this end, we use Theo-
rem 6.6 to reduce the acyclicity check to the one required
when proving the usual opacity, i.e., checking the absence
1 Value clock, reg[NRegs], ver[NRegs];
2 Lock lock[NRegs];
3 Bool active[NThreads];
4 Set<Register> rset; // for each transaction
5 Map<Register, Value> wset; // for each transaction
6 Value rver; // for each transaction, initially ⊥
7 Value wver; // for each transaction, initially ⊤
8
9 function txcommit(Transaction T):
10 Set<Lock> lset := ∅;
11 foreach x in wset[T]:
12 Bool locked := lock[x].trylock();
13 if (¬locked):
14 lset.add(x);
15 else:
16 foreach y in lset[T]:
17 lock[y].unlock();
18 return aborted(T);
19 wver[T] := fetch_and_increment(clock)+1;
20 foreach x in rset[T].keys():
21 Bool locked := lock[x].test();
22 Value ts := ver[x];
23 if (locked ∨ rver[T] < ts):
24 foreach y in lset[T]:
25 lock[y].unlock();
26 return aborted(T);
27 foreach (x, v) in wset[T]:
28 reg[x] := v;
29 ver[x] := wver[T];
30 lock[x].unlock();
31 return committed(T);
32
33 function fence():
34 Bool r[NThreads]; // initially all false
35 foreach t in ThreadID:
36 r[t] := active[t];
37 foreach t in ThreadID:
38 if (r[t]):
39 while (active[t]);
40 return;
Figure 7. A fragment of the TL2 algorithm.
of cycles over transactions in RT∪WR∪WW∪ RW (check-
ing the absence of cycles with a single dependency is easier
and we omit its description for brevity). In our proof, only
graph updates of the read and commit operations of each
transaction impose proof obligations.
At every step of the graph construction, we maintain an
inductive invariant that helps us prove both consistency of
the history and the acyclicity of RT ∪WR ∪WW ∪ RW. Its
most important part associates a notion of time with the
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edges of the graph based on the read and write timestamps
of transactions:
1. ∀T ,T ′.T RT−−→ T ′ =⇒ rver[T ′] = ⊥ ∨
((vis(T ) =⇒ wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′]) ∧
(¬vis(T ) =⇒ rver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′])).
2. ∀T ,T ′.T WR−−→ T ′ =⇒ wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′].
3. ∀T ,T ′.T RW−−→ T ′ =⇒ rver[T ] < wver[T ′].
4. ∀T ,T ′.T WW−−−→ T ′ =⇒ wver[T ] < wver[T ′].
Property 1 asserts that, whenever a transaction T ′ occurs
after a completed transaction T in the real time, it either has
not yet generated a read timestamp rver[T ′], or it has and
rver[T ′] is greater or equal to wver[T ] (when T is visible
and, therefore, committed) or rver[T ] (otherwise). Property
2 asserts that, whenever a transaction T ′ reads a value of
a register written by a transaction T , the version that T ′
assigned to the register may not be greater than the read
timestamp of T . This is validated by the check TL2 performs
when reading registers. Property 3 asserts that a transaction
T ′ overwriting the value read by a transactionT has the write
timestamp greater than the read timestamp of T . It holds
because, if T ′ commits its write after T reads the previous
value of the register, then T generates its read timestamp
before T ′ generates its write timestamp. Property 4 follows
from the mutual exclusion that TL2 ensures for committing
transactions that write the same register x (using lock[x]).
Since writes in commit operations occur within a critical
section, write dependencies are always consistent with the
order on write timestamps.
With the help of the above invariant, we establish that for a
path between any transactionsT andT ′ in the graph, certain
inequalities between their timestamps take place depending
on visibility of the two transactions, such as the following:
vis(T ) ∧ vis(T ′) =⇒ wver[T ] < wver[T ′]. (1)
Using this and otherminor observations, we can demonstrate
that graph updates preserve the acyclicity ofRT∪WR∪WW∪
RW, by showing that a cycle would imply a contradiction
involving the timestamps of transactions. As an example
of such reasoning, consider a transaction T executing the
txcommit operation. As T reaches line 27, we mark it as
visible and add new write dependencies in the graph. Let us
assume that addingT ′ WW−−−→ T , whereT ′ is some transaction,
causes a cycle over transactions. Then there must exist a
path from T to T ′. Note that vis(T ) and vis(T ′) both hold,
since they are ordered byWW. By (1), wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
holds, because there is a path fromT toT ′. On the other hand,
Property 4 above gives us wver[T ′] < wver[T ], sinceT ′ WW−−−→
T is in the graph. Thus, we have arrived to a contradiction.
8 Related and Future Work
In this paper we have concentrated on one technique for en-
suring privatization safety—transactional fences. However,
there have been several proposals of alternative techniques
(see [21, §4.6.1] for a survey), and in the future, we plan to
address these. In particular, some TMs do not require trans-
actional fences for safe privatization [10, 13, 36, 41], even
though the programmer still has to follow a certain DRF dis-
cipline. Such a discipline has been proposed by Dalessandro
and Scott [8, 9], but it did not come with a formal justica-
tion, such as our proofs of the Fundamental Property and
TM correctness.
Kestor et al. [24] proposed a notion of DRF for TMs that
do not support safe privatization and a race-detection tool
for this notion. Unlike us, they do not consider transactional
fences, so that the only way to safely privatize an object is
to agree on its status outside transactions (Figure 6). Our
notion of DRF specializes to the one by Kestor et al. if we
consider only histories without fences. We hope that, in the
future, race-detection tools like the one of Kestor et al. can
be adapted to detect our notion of data races.
Lesani et al. [28] proposed a transactional DRF based on
TMS [14], a TM consistency criterion. However, as they ac-
knowledge, their proposal does not support privatization.
To the best of our knowledge, a line of work by Abadi et al.
was the only one that proposed disciplines for privatization
with a formal justication of their safety [3, 4]. However, they
did not take into account transactional fences and considered
programming disciplines more restrictive than ours. Their
static separation [4] ensures strong atomicity by not mixing
transactional and non-transactional accesses to the same
register. Dynamic separation [3] relaxes this by introducing
explicit commands to privatize and publish an object. We
believe such disciplines are particular ways of achieving the
more general notion of data-race freedom that we adopted.
We have previously proposed a logic for reasoning about
programs using RCU [17]. Since transactional fences are
similar to RCU, we believe this logic can be adapted to guide
programmers in inserting fences to satisfy our notion of DRF.
In this paper we assumed sequential consistency as a base-
line non-transactional memory model. However, transac-
tions are being integrated into languages, such as C++, that
have weaker memory models [1]. Our denition of a data
race is given in the axiomatic style used in the C++ memory
model [2]. For this reason, we believe that our results can in
the future be adapted to the more complex setting of C++.
Guerraoui et al. [18] considered TMs that provide strong
atomicity without making any assumptions about the client
program. They formalized the requirement on such TMs
as parameterized opacity and proved the impossibility of
achieving it onmanymemorymodels without instrumenting
non-transactional accesses. This result justies our decision
to provide strong atomicity only to DRF programs.
Acknowledgments. We thank Michael Spear and Tingzhe
Zhou for discussions about privatization in TM.
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A Programming Language
A.1 Formal Denition of Traces
To formalize restrictions on accesses to variables by primi-
tive commands, we partition the set PComm intom classes:
PComm =
⊎m
t=1 LPcommt . The intention is that commands
from LPcommt can access only the local variables of thread
t (LVart ). To ensure that in our programming language a
thread t does not access local variables of other threads, we
require that the thread cannot mention such variables in
the conditions of if and while commands and can only use
primitive commands from LPcommt .
Denition A.1. A trace τ is a nite sequence of actions
satisfying the following well-formedness conditions:
1. every action in τ has a unique identier: if τ =
τ1 (a1, _, _) τ2 (a2, _, _) τ3 then a1 , a2;
2. commands in actions executed by a thread t do not access
local variables of other threads t ′ , t : if τ = _ (_, t , c ) _
then c ∈ LPcommt ;
3. every write operation writes a unique value: if τ =
_ (_, _,write(_,v )) _ (_, _,write(_,v ′)) _ then v , v ′;
4. for every thread t , the projection τ |t of τ onto the actions
by t cannot contain a request action immediately followed
by a primitive action: if τ |t = _α1α2_ and α1 is a request
then α2 is a response;
5. request and response actions are properly matched: for
every thread t , history(τ ) |t consists of alternating request
and corresponding response actions, starting from a re-
quest action;
6. actions denoting the beginning and end of transactions
are properly matched: for every thread t , in the projec-
tion of τ |t to txbegin, commied and aborted actions,
txbegin alternates with commied or aborted, starting
from txbegin;
7. non-transactional accesses execute atomically: if τ =
τ1 α τ2, where α is a read or a write request action by
thread t , and all the transactions of t in τ1 completed, then
τ2 begins with a response to α .
8. non-transactional accesses never abort: if τ = _α1 α2 τ2,
where α1 is a non-transactional request action then α2 is
not an aborted action;
9. fence actions may not occur inside transactions; if τ =
τ1 ( t , fbegin) _ the all the transactions t in τ1 completed;
and
10. fence blocks until all active transactions complete:
if τ = τ1 (_, t , txbegin) τ2 (_, t ′, fbegin) τ3 (_, t ′, fend) τ4
then either τ2 or τ3 contains an action of the form
(_, t , commied) or (_, t , aborted).
A.2 Formal Denition of the Semantics of the
Programming Language
This section formally denes the set JPK(s ). It is computed
in two stages. First, we compute a set A(P ) of traces that
resolves all issues regarding sequential control ow and in-
terleaving. Intuitively, if one thinks of each threadCt in P as
a control-ow graph, then A(P ) contains all possible inter-
leavings of paths in the graphs of Ct , t ∈ ThreadID starting
from their initial nodes. The set A(P ) is a superset of all the
traces that can actually be executed: e.g., if a thread executes
the command “x := 1; if (x = 1) y := 1 else y := 2” where
x ,y are local variables, then A(P ) will contain a trace where
y := 2 is executed instead ofy := 1. To lter out such nonsen-
sical traces, we evaluate every trace to determine whether it
is valid, i.e., whether its control ow is consistent with the
eect of its actions on program variables. This is formalized
by a function eval : State × Trace → P (State) ∪ { } that,
given an initial state and a trace, produces the set of states re-
sulting from executing the actions in the trace, an empty set
if the trace is invalid, or a special state  if the trace contains
a fault action. Thus, JPK(s ) = {τ ∈ A(P ) | eval(s,τ ) , ∅}.
When dening the semantics, we encode the evaluation
of conditions in if and while statements with assume com-
mands. More specically, we expect that the sets LPcommt
contain special primitive commands assume(b), where b is
a Boolean expression over local variables of thread t , den-
ing the condition. We state their semantics formally below;
informally, assume(b) does nothing if b holds in the current
program state, and stops the computation otherwise. Thus,
it allows the computation to proceed only if b holds. The
assume commands are only used in dening the semantics
of the programming language; hence, we forbid threads from
using them directly.
The trace set A(P ). The function A′(·) in Figure 8 maps
commands and programs to sequences of actions they may
produce. Technically, A′(·) might contain sequences that are
not traces, e.g., because they do not have unique identiers
or continue beyond a fault command. This is resolved by
intersecting the set A′(P ) with the set of all traces to dene
A(P ). A′(C )t gives the set of action sequences produced by a
commandC when it is executed by thread t . To dene A′(P ),
we rst compute the set of all the interleavings of action
sequences produced by the threads constituting P . Formally,
τ ∈ interleave(τ1, . . . ,τm ) if and only if every action in τ
is performed by some thread t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and τ |t = τt
for every thread t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We then let A′(P ) be the
set of all prexes of the resulting sequences which respect
Denition A.1, as denoted by the prefix operator. We take
prex closure here (while respecting the atomicity of non
transactional access) to account for incomplete program com-
putations as well as those in which the scheduler preempts
a thread forever.
A′(c )t returns a singleton set with the action correspond-
ing to the primitive command c (primitive commands execute
atomically). A′(C1;C2)t concatenates all possible action se-
quences corresponding to C1 with those corresponding to
C2. The set of action sequences of a conditional considers
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A′(c )t = {(_, t , c )}
A′(C1;C2)t = {τ1 τ2 | τ1 ∈ A′(C1)t ∧ τ2 ∈ A′(C2)t }
A′(if (b) then C1 else C2)t = {(_, t , assume(b)) τ1 | τ1 ∈ A′(C1)t } ∪ {(_, t , assume(¬b)) τ2 | τ2 ∈ A′(C2)t
A′(while (b) do C )t = {τ1 τ2 . . . τ2n (_, t , assume(¬b)) | n ∈ N ∧ ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. τ2j−1 = (_, t , assume(b))
∧ τ2j ∈ A′(C )t } ∪ {(_, t , assume(¬b))}
A′(l := x .read())t = {(_, t , read(x )) (_, t , ret(v )) (_, t , l := v ) | v ∈ Z} ∪ {(_, t , read(x )) (_, t , aborted)}
A′(x .write(e ))t = {(_, t , assume(e = v )) (_, t ,write(x ,v )) (_, t , ret(⊥))) | v ∈ Z}
∪ {(_, t , assume(e = v )) (_, t ,write(x ,v )) (_, t , aborted) | v ∈ Z}
A′(fence)t = {(_, t , fbegin) (_, t , fend)}
A′(x := atomic {C})t = {(_, t , txbegin) (_, t , aborted) (_, t ,x := aborted)}
∪ {(_, t , txbegin) (_, t , ok) τ (_, t , aborted) (_, t ,x := aborted) |
τ (_, t , aborted) τ ′ ∈ A′(C )t ∧ (_, t , aborted) < τ }
∪ {(_, t , txbegin) (_, t , ok) τ (_, t , txcommit) (_, t , r ) (_, t ,x := r ) |
τ ∈ A′(C )t ∧ (_, t , aborted) < τ ∧ (r = commied ∨ r = aborted)}
A′(C1 ‖ . . . ‖ Cm ) = prefix(⋃{interleave(τ1, . . . ,τm ) | ∀t . 1 ≤ t ≤ m =⇒ τt ∈ A′(Ct )t })
A(P ) = A′(P ) ∩ Trace
Figure 8. The denition of A(P ).
cases where either branch is taken. We record the decision
using an assume action; at the evaluation stage, this allows
us to ensure that this decision is consistent with the program
state. The set of action sequences for a loop is dened by
considering all possible unfoldings of the loop body. Again,
we record branching decisions using assume actions.
The set of action sequences of read and write accesses in-
cludes both sequences where the access executes successfully
and where the current transaction is aborted. The former
set is constructed by nondeterministically choosing an inte-
gers v to describe the the return and parameter for the read
and write accesses, respectively. To ensure that e indeed
evaluates to v , in the case of a write, Note that some of the
choices here might not be feasible: the chosen v might not
be the value of the parameter expression e when the method
is invoked. Such infeasible choices are ltered out at the fol-
lowing stages of the semantics denition: the former in the
denition of JPK(s ) by the use of evaluation and the seman-
tics of assume, and the latter in the denition of JP ,H K(s )
by selecting the sequences from JPK(s ) that interact with the
transactional memory correctly. The set of action sequences
of a fence command is comprised of all traces comprised
of a fbegin action followed by a fend action, indicating that
once a fence command is invoked, the thread gets blocked
until it ends. The set of action sequences of x := atomic {C}
contains those in which C is aborted in the middle of its
execution (at an object operation or right after it begins) and
those in which C executes until completion and then the
transaction commits or aborts.
Semantics of primitive commands. To dene evaluation,
we assume a semantics of every command c ∈ PComm,
given by a function JcK that denes how the program state
is transformed by executing c . As we noted before, dierent
classes of primitive commands are supposed to access only
certain subsets of variables. To ensure that this is indeed the
case, we dene JcK as a function of only those variables that c
is allowed to access. Namely, the semantics of c ∈ LPcommt
is given by
JcK : (LVart → Z) → P (LVart → Z).
Note that we allow c to be non-deterministic.
For a valuation q of variables that c is allowed to access,JcK(q) yields the set of their valuations that can be obtained
by executing c from a state with variable values q. For ex-
ample, an assignment command l := l ′ has the following
semantics:
Jl := l ′K(q) = {q[l 7→ q(l ′)]} .
We dene the semantics of assume commands following the
informal explanation given at the beginning of this section:
for example,
Jassume(l = v )K(q) = 
{q}, if q(l ) = v ;
∅, otherwise. (2)
Thus, when the condition in assume does not hold of q,
the command stops the computation by not producing any
output.
We lift functions JcK to full states by keeping the variables
that c is not allowed to access unmodied and producing  
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if c faults. For example, if c ∈ LPcommt , thenJcK(s ) = {s |LVar\LVart ⊎ q | q ∈ JcK(s |LVart )},
where s |V is the restriction of s to variables in V . (For sim-
plicity, we assume commands to not fault.)
Trace evaluation. Using the semantics of primitive com-
mands, we rst dene the evaluation of a single action on a
given state:
eval : State × Action→ P (State)
eval(s, (_, t , c )) = JcK(s );
eval(s,ψ ) = {s}.
Note that this does not change the state s as a result of
TM interface or fence actions, since their return values are
assigned to local variables by separate actions introduced
when generating A(P ). We then lift eval to traces as follows:
eval : State × Trace→ P (State)
eval(s,τ ) =
∅, if τ = τ
′φ ∧ eval(s,τ ′) = ∅;
evalna(s,τ |¬abortact), otherwise,
where τ |¬abortact denotes the trace obtained from τ by remov-
ing all actions inside aborted transactions, and
evalna(s,τ ) =
{s}, if τ = ε ;
{s ′′ ∈ eval(s ′,φ) | s ′ ∈ evalna(s,τ ′)}, if τ = τ ′φ.
The set of states resulting from evaluating trace τ from
state s is eectively computed by the helper function
evalna(s,τ ), which ignores actions inside aborted transac-
tions to model local variable roll-back. However, ignoring
the contents of aborted transactions completely poses a risk
that we might consider traces including sequences of actions
inside aborted transactions that yield an empty set of states.
To mitigate this, eval(s,τ ) recursively evaluates every prex
of τ , thus ensuring that sequences of actions inside aborted
transaction are valid.
Recall that we dene JPK(s ) as the set of those traces
from A(P ) that can be evaluated from s without getting
stuck, as formalized by eval. Note that this denition en-
ables the semantics of assume dened by (2) to lter out
traces that make branching decisions inconsistent with the
program state. For example, consider again the program
“l := 1; if (l = 1) l ′ := 1 else l ′ := 2”. The set A(P ) includes
traces where both branches are explored. However, due to
the semantics of the assume actions added to the traces ac-
cording to Figure 8, only the trace executing l ′ := 1 will
result in a nonempty set of nal states after the evaluation
and, therefore, only this trace will be included into JPK(s ).
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Lemma 5.4. IfH is a TM such thatH |DRF ⊑ Hatomic, then:
1. ∀P , s .DRF(P , s,H ) =⇒ JPK(H , s )  JPK(Hatomic, s ).
2. ∀P , s .DRF(P , s,Hatomic) =⇒ DRF(P , s,H ).
The key step in the proof of Lemma 5.4(1) is the next
lemma. It shows that a trace τH with a history H can be
transformed into an equivalent trace τS with a history S that
is in the opacity relation with H .
Lemma B.1 (Rearrangement).
∀H , S ∈ History.H ⊑ S =⇒ (∀τH . history(τH ) = H =⇒
∃τS . history(τS ) = S ∧ τH ∼ τS ).
The proof follows the proof of the corresponding lemma
in [7] and is omitted.
We also rely on the following proposition that allows us to
conclude that the trace τS resulting from the rearrangement
in Lemma B.1 can be produced by a program P if so can the
original trace τH .
Proposition B.2. If τH ∈ JPK(s ) and τH ∼ τS , then τS ∈JPK(s ).
This proposition follows immediately from Denition 5.1
and the denition of A(P ) in Figure 8.
Lemma B.1 and Proposition B.2 together yield the follow-
ing corollary, from which Lemma 5.4(1) follows.
Corollary B.3. If H is a TM such that H |DRF ⊑ Hatomic,
then:
∀P , s,τH . τH ∈ JPK(H , s ) ∧ DRF(τH ) =⇒
∃τS . τS ∈ JPK(Hatomic, s ) ∧
history(τH ) ⊑ history(τS ) ∧ τH ∼ τS .
The following proposition states the prex-closure prop-
erty of the programming language semantics.
Proposition B.4. For every program P , TM H and state s ,
the set JPK(H , s ) is prex-closed.
Proof of Lemma 5.4(2). Let us consider a TM H such that
H |DRF ⊑ Hatomic, any client program P and an initial state s .
We prove the theorem by contrapositive, i.e., by demonstrat-
ing:
¬DRF(P , s,H ) =⇒ ¬DRF(P , s,Hatomic)
Let us assume that DRF(P , s,H ) does not hold. By Deni-
tion 3.3, there exists τˆ ∈ JPK(H , s ) such that its history
Hˆ = history(τˆ ) is racy, i.e., DRF(Hˆ ) does not hold. More
specically, τˆ contains a data race (α ′,α ). Note that there
might be multiple races in τˆ , and we choose such race (α ′,α )
that the later of the two actions, α , is the earliest in the exe-
cution order of Hˆ . We split the further proof depending on
whether α is transactional or non-transactional.
Case 1: α is non-transactional. Let τˆ take form of
τˆ = τ α β _, where β is a matching response action for α
and τ is a prex of τˆ containing α ′. It is easy to see that
our choice of the data race is such that τ α β is racy and τ
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is data-race free. Additionally, as stated in Proposition B.4,JPK(H , s ) is prex-closed. Therefore, both τ α β ∈ JPK(H , s )
and τ ∈ JPK(H , s ) hold. By Corollary B.3, there exists a trace
τ ′ ∈ JPK(Hatomic, s ) such that its history S = history(τ ′) ∈
Hatomic is in the strong opacity relation with H = history(τ )
(H ⊑ S) and τ ∼ τ ′.
Let us consider a trace τ ′′ = τ ′α β ′, which extends τ ′ with
the request action α and a matching response β ′ in such a
way that its history S ′′ = S α β ′ ∈ Hatomic. Such response β ′
and a trace τ ′′ exist, since S α is a non-interleaved history,
and it is easy to see that it can always be extended with a
response to α (not necessarily returning the same result as
β).
Since τ ∼ τ ′, we have τ α β ∼ τ ′α β according to Def-
inition 5.1. Therefore, by Proposition B.2, τ ′α β ∈ JPK(s ).
Also, as evident from the denition of A(P ) in Figure 8,
A(P ) is closed under replacing a return value of a trailing
read-response action, so τ ′′ ∈ JPK(s ) holds. Knowing that
S ′′ ∈ Hatomic, we conclude that τ ′′ ∈ JPK(Hatomic, s ).
We argue that hb(H α β ) = hb(S ′′). First, since τ α β ∼
τ ′α β and τ ′′ diers from τ ′α β only in the return value of
β ′, cl(H α β ) = cl(S ′′) and po(H α ) = po(S ′′) hold. Since
α is neither a fence action nor a beginning or an end of
a transaction, af (H α β ) = af (S ′′) and bf (H α β ) = bf (S ′′)
hold too. Finally, since α is non-transactional, it does not
contribute to (xpo(S ′′) ; txwr(S ′′)). Overall, hb(H α β ) =
hb(S ′′) holds.
Knowing that hb(history(τ α β )) = hb(H α β ) =
hb(S ′′) and that the conict (α ′,α ) is unordered in
hb(history(τ α β )), we conclude that (α ′,α ) is a data race
in τ ′′.
Case 2: α is transactional. Let τˆ take form of τˆ = τ α _,
where the prex τ contains α ′. It is easy to see that our
choice of the data race is such that τ α is racy and τ is
data-race free. Additionally, as stated in Proposition B.4,JPK(H , s ) is prex-closed. Therefore, both τ α ∈ JPK(H , s )
and τ ∈ JPK(H , s ) hold. By Corollary B.3, there exists a trace
τ ′ ∈ JPK(Hatomic, s ) such that its history S = history(τ ′) ∈
Hatomic is in the strong opacity relation with H = history(τ )
(H ⊑ S) and τ ∼ τ ′.
Let us consider a trace τ ′′ obtained from τ ′ by inserting
α after the last action by the same thread. It is easy to see
that τ ′′ is well-formed and that S ′ = history(τ ′′) is non-
interleaved, meaning that S ′ ∈ Hatomic holds.
Since τ ∼ τ ′, the following holds:
(∀t ∈ ThreadID. τ |t = τ ′ |t ) ∧ (τ |nontx = τ ′ |nontx).
Note that the following holds, because α is transactional:
τ ′′ |nontx = τ ′ |nontx = τ |nontx = (τ α ) |nontx.
Let t ′ be the thread of α . For all t ∈ ThreadID \ {t ′}, the
following holds, because α is by a dierent thread:
(τ α ) |t = τ |t = τ ′ |t = τ ′′ |t ,
and (τ α ) |t ′ = τ ′′ |t ′ by construction. Overall, we have:
(∀t ∈ ThreadID. (τ α ) |t = τ ′′ |t ) ∧ ((τ α ) |nontx = τ ′′ |nontx),
so τ α ∼ τ ′′. Therefore, by Proposition B.2, τ ′′ ∈ JPK(s ).
Knowing that S ′ ∈ Hatomic, we conclude that τ ′′ ∈JPK(Hatomic, s ).
We argue that hb(H α ) = hb(S ′). Similarly to Case 1, we
observe that po, cl, af and bf components of hb(H α ) and
hb(S ′) are equal. Let us consider the edges from (xpo(H α ) ;
txwr(H α )) that may appear in hb(H α ) \ hb(H ):
• if α is a write request, then {(β , β ′) | β <xpo(H α )
α <txwr(H α ) β
′};
• if α is a read request, then {(β,α ) | ∃β ′. β <xpo(H α )
β ′ <txwr(H α ) α }.
Note that txwr(H α ) = txwr(S ′), because H α and S ′ are his-
tories with unique writes, so read-dependencies are uniquely
determined. Also, xpo(H α ) = xpo(S ′), because α is executed
within the same transaction in the two histories. Therefore,
the aforementioned edges are present in hb(H α ) if and only
if they are present in hb(S ′). Overall, hb(H α ) = hb(S ′) holds.
Knowing that hb(history(τ α )) = hb(S ′) and that the con-
ict (α ′,α ) is unordered in hb(history(τ α )), we conclude
that (α ′,α ) is a data race in τ ′α . 
B.2 Proof of Lemma 6.4
Lemma6.4. ∀H1. cons(H1) ∧ (∃G ∈ Graph(H1). acyclic(G ))
=⇒ (∃H2 ∈ Hatomic.H1 ⊑ H2).
To prove Lemma 6.4, we introduce a notion of fenced opac-
ity graphs, which extend opacity graphs with fence actions.
We prove that fenced opacity graphs are acyclic when corre-
sponding opacity graphs are.
Let fact(H ) denote the set of all fence actions of a history
H , or formally:
fact(H ) , {(a, t , fbegin) | (a, t , fbegin) ∈ act(H )}
∪ {(a, t , fbegin) | (a, t , fend) ∈ act(H )}.
DenitionB.5. Given a historyH and its opacity graphG =
(N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈ Graph(H ), we dene a match-
ing fenced graph G as a tuple (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW),
where:
• N = N ∪ fact(H ) extends the set of nodes of G with
nodes denoting fence actions of the history H ;
• HB ∈ P (N × N ) is such that
n
HB−−→ n′ ⇐⇒ ∃α ,α ′. (α ∈ n ∨ α = n ∈ fact(H ))
∧ (α ′ ∈ n′ ∨ α ′ = n′ ∈ fact(H )) ∧ α <hb(H ) α ′.
That is, a fenced graphG corresponding toG ∈ Graph(H )
simply extends G with fence actions and happens-before
edges.
Proposition B.6. ∀H ,G .G ∈ Graph(H ) ∧ acyclic(G )
=⇒ acyclic(G ).
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Proof. Let G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) and G =
(N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW). It is easy to see that:
HB = HB ⊎ {(α ,α ′) | α <hb(H ) α ′ ∧
(α ∈ fact(H ) ∨ α ′ ∈ fact(H ))}
That is, all edges between non-fence nodes implied by tran-
sitivity via fence nodes in G are already present in G. We
know that G is acyclic. Therefore, if G contains a cycle, it
necessarily involves fence actions.
Let us rst consider a cycle over nodes of G consisting
entirely of fence action nodes. The cycle takes the following
form then:
ϕ1
HB−−→ ϕ2 HB−−→ . . . HB−−→ ϕk HB−−→ ϕ1,
where k is the length of the cycle and ϕi is a fence action
for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k . For each consecutive ϕi
and ϕi+1 in the cycle, we assume that there is no non-fence
action n such that ϕi
HB−−→ n HB−−→ ϕi+1 (we consider cycles
involving non-fence actions separately). By Denition 6.3,
the following must be the case:
ϕ1 <hb(H ) ϕ2 <hb(H ) . . . <hb(H ) ϕk <hb(H ) ϕ1,
It is easy to see that such cycle is not possible: without inter-
mediate non-fence actions, fence actions can only be related
by po(H ) in hb(H ), and po(H ) is not cyclic.
We now consider a cycle in G involving at least one node
that does not correspond to a fence action. We consider each
sequence of fence actions in the cycle surrounded by non-
fence actions:
n
HB−−→ ϕ1 HB−−→ ϕ2 HB−−→ . . . HB−−→ ϕk HB−−→ n′
where n and n′ denote non-fence actions (or, possibly, the
same non-fence action), and for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k), ϕi is
a fence action. Since HB is transitive, n HB−−→ n′ is present
in the graph G. By replacing each segment of fence actions
in the cycle with HB-edges between non-fence actions, we
transform the cycle in G into a cycle in G. By the premise
of the proposition, acyclic(G ) holds. Thus, we arrive to a
contradiction, meaning that acyclic(G ) holds. 
Before proving Lemma 6.4, let us restate the denition of
Hatomic from §2.4.
Denition B.7. In a non-interleaved history H , a read re-
quest (_, _, read(x )) and its matching response (_, _, ret(v ))
are said to be legal, if v is the value returned by the last
preceding write(x ,v ) action that is not located in an aborted
or live transaction dierent from the one of the read; if there
is no such write, then v = vinit.
Thus, Hatomic can be dened as the set of all non-
interleaved histories H that have a completion H c , in which
every pair of a matching read request and response is legal.
Proof of Lemma 6.4. In the proof, we only consider nite his-
tories of TM. LetH1 be an consistent TMhistory. Assume that
there exists an acyclic graph G ∈ Graph(H1). We consider
its matching fenced graph G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW),
which is acyclic by Proposition B.6.
Let k be the number of nodes in N and a sequence S =
n1n2 . . .nk be the result of a topological sort of graphG . Let
≺S be a relation on nodes of S such that n ≺S n′ if n occurs
earlier than n′ in S .
We dene a relation lin ⊆ act(H1) × act(H1) on actions of
history H1 so that for every actions α <lin α ′ if for n,n′ ∈ S
such that α ∈ n and α ′ ∈ n′, either n = n′ ∧ α <po(H1 ) α ′ or
n , n′ ∧ n ≺S n′ holds. It is easy to see that lin is a linear
order on act(H1).
LetH2 be a sequence obtained by putting the actions of the
history H2 in the order lin. Note that hb(H ) ⊆ lin. Therefore,
by Denition 4.1, H1 ⊑ H2 holds. It is easy to see that H2 is
non-interleaved. To conclude that H2 ∈ Hatomic, it remains
to show that it has a non-interleaved completion, in which
every matching read request and response are legal.
Let H c2 be a non-interleaved completion of H2 obtained by
committing each transaction from vis and aborting all other
commit-pending transaction. We argue that cons(H c2 ) holds.
It is easy to see that local read actions are consistent in H c2 .
Consider any non-local read (α ,α ′). Since cons(H1) holds,
there are two possibilities:
• There exists a non-local β such that β <wr_ α ′ and β
is not located in an aborted or live transaction in H1.
Let n ∈ N be the node of Gˆ containing β . By Deni-
tion 6.3, n ∈ vis holds. Therefore, n is not an aborted
or live transaction in H c2 either, meaning that (α ,α ′)
is consistent in H c2 .• There is no such write β , and α ′ returns vinit. It is easy
to see that (α ,α ′) is consistent in H c2 .
We consider every read request α = (_, _, read(x )) and its
matching response α ′ = (_, _, ret(v )) in H c2 . When (α ,α ′) ∈
local(H c2 ), the consistency of H c2 immediately implies that
(α ,α ′) is legal.
Let us assume that (α ,α ′) < local(H c2 ), and letn be its node
in the graph Gˆ. By Denition 6.2, there are two possibilities:
• there exists a non-local β1 not located in an aborted
or live transaction and such that β1 <wrx (H c2 ) α
′; or
• v = vinit, otherwise.
Let us assume that there is no β1 satisfying the above and
that v = vinit. Consider any action β2 = (_, _,write(x , _))
in H c2 that is not located in a live or aborted transaction,
and let n2 denote its node in Gˆ. Knowing that n2 is not an
aborted transaction in H c2 , we conclude that n ∈ vis holds.
By Denition 6.3, n
RWx−−−→ n2 holds. Since lin is a topological
sort of the order including RWx , all actions of the node n2
occur after all actions of the node n, meaning that β2 does
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not precede α in H c2 . Therefore, It is easy to see that (α ,α ′)
is legal.
We now consider the case when in H c2 there exists a non-
local β1 not located in an aborted or live transaction and such
that β1 <wrx (H c2 ) α
′. It is easy to see that in order to conclude
that (α ,α ′) is legal, we only need to prove that β1 is the most
recent write to x preceding α . Let n and n1 be the nodes of α
and β1 accordingly in the graph G. Firstly, we observe that
β1 <wrx (H1 ) α holds and, hence, so does n1
WR−−→ n. Since lin
is a topological sort of the order including WR, actions of
n1 precede actions of n in H c2 . Therefore, β1 precedes α in
H c2 . Let us consider any other write β2 = (_, _,write(x , _))
that occurs after β1 in H c2 and that is not located in a live
or aborted transaction. Let n2 be its node in the graph G.
Knowing that n2 is not an aborted transaction in H c2 , we
conclude that n ∈ vis holds. By Denition 6.3, WW totally
orders visible nodes writing to the same register, so either
n2
WW−−−→ n1 orn1 WW−−−→ n2 holds. Recall that lin is a topological
sort of the order including WW and RW. Consequently, it
can only be the case that n1
WW−−−→ n2 holds. By Denition 6.3,
n
RW−−→ n2 holds too, and, hence, α <lin β2. Thus, we have
shown that β1 is the last write to x that precedes α and that
is not located in an aborted or live transaction, meaning that
(α ,α ′) is legal. 
B.3 Proof of Theorem 6.6
Lemma B.8. Let a DRF history H and its graph G =
(N , _,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈ Graph(H ) be such that (HB ;
(WR∪WW∪RW)) is irreexive. Then for all nodes n,n′ ∈ N ,
such that at most one of them is a transaction:
n
WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−→ n′ =⇒ n HB−−→ n′.
Proof. Let us rst consider two nodes n = ν and n′ = ν ′ that
are non-transactional accesses such that ν WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−→ ν ′.
All non-transactional actions are totally ordered by cl(H ),
and, therefore, by hb(H ). Consequently, at least one of the
two edges, ν HB−−→ ν ′ and ν ′ HB−−→ ν , is present in the graph G.
Knowing that (HB ; (WR ∪WW ∪ RW)) is irreexive, we
conclude that only the former edge is possible, i.e., ν HB−−→ ν ′
holds.
Let us now consider a node-transaction n = T and a non-
transactional access n′ = ν such that T WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−→ ν (the
case when n is a non-transactional access and n′ is a trans-
action is analogous). We rst assume thatT and ν are by the
same thread. Then either T HB−−→ ν or ν HB−−→ T holds, since
actions of T and ν are related by program order accordingly.
Knowing that (HB ; (WR ∪WW ∪ RW)) is irreexive, we
conclude that it is only possible that T HB−−→ ν .
We now considerT and ν that are by dierent threads. Let
α ′ be the request action of ν . It is easy to see from Deni-
tion 6.3 of edges of the opacity graph that there exists an ac-
tion α ∈ T and a register x such that α and α ′ access x . Since
α and α ′ are by dierent threads and access the same register,
they form a conict. However, H is DRF, so by Denition 3.2,
eitherα <hb(H ) α ′ orα ′ <hb(H ) α holds.When lifted to nodes
of the opacity graph, it is the case that either T HB−−→ ν or
ν
HB−−→ T . Knowing that (HB ; (WR∪WW∪RW)) is irreex-
ive, we conclude that it is only possible that T HB−−→ ν . 
Given a history H and a graph G = (H , _, _,WR, _, _),
we write n TXWR−−−−→ n′ when n,n′ ∈ txns(H ) and n WR−−→ n′.
We also use a shorthand xpotxwr(H ) = ⋃x ∈Reg (xpo(H ) ;
txwrx (H )).
Denition B.9. A hb-path π in a history H is a (possibly
empty) sequence of triples:
π = (α1,R1,α2) (α2,R2,α3) . . . (αm−1,Rm−1,αm ),
such that:
• α1,α2, . . . ,αm ∈ act(H );
• each Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ m−1) is one of the following relations:
po(H ), cl(H ), af (H ), bf (H ) and xpotxwr(H ).
• for every i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, αi <Ri αi+1.
We let Paths(H ) denote the set of all hb-paths in H .
DenitionB.10. Given a historyH and transactionsT ,T ′ ∈
txns(H ), we let TXPathsn (H ,T ,T ′) ⊆ Paths(H ) denote the
set of all hb-paths satisfying the following conditions:
• the hb-path starts with an action of T and ends with
an action of T ′;
• n is the number of occurrences of triples of the form
(_, xpotxwr(H ), _) in the hb-path.
Lemma B.11. For a history H ∈ History, an opacity graph
G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈ Graph(H ) and two
distinct transactions T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ), if T HB−−→ T ′, then
T
RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′.
Proof. By Denition 6.3, T HB−−→ T ′ if and only if there exist
α ∈ T and α ′ ∈ T ′ such that α <hb(H ) α ′. It is easy to see that
T
HB−−→ T ′ holds if and only if ⋃n≥0 TXPathsn (H ,T ,T ′) , ∅.
Thus, to prove the lemma, we demonstrate that for a given
history H and its graph G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈
Graph(H ), the following holds:
∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T , T ′∧
⋃
n≥0
TXPathsn (H ,T ,T ′) , ∅ =⇒
T
RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′. (3)
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We dene Φ(n) as the following auxiliary statement:
∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T , T ′ ∧ TXPathsn (H ,T ,T ′) , ∅ =⇒
T
RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′.
To prove (3), we show that Φ(n) holds for all n ≥ 0 by induc-
tion on n.
Base of the induction. Let us consider two distinct
transactions T and T ′ and the hb-paths TXPaths0 (H ,T ,T ′)
between them. Since these hb-paths begin and end in dif-
ferent transactions and only feature relations po(H ), cl(H ),
af (H ) and bf (H ), every hb-path TXPaths0 (H ,T ,T ′) includes
actions denoting the end of T and the beginning of T ′.
Hence, there exists a path π = (α , _, _) . . . (_, _,α ′) ∈
TXPaths0 (H ,T ,T ′) such that α is the end of a transaction T
and α ′ is the beginning of a transaction T ′. Since relations
po(H ), cl(H ), af (H ) and bf (H ) are all consistent with the
history execution order <H (see §3), α <H α ′. Therefore,
T
RT−−→ T ′ holds.
Induction step. Assuming that Φ(i ) holds for i ≤ n,
we demonstrate that so does Φ(n + 1). Let us consider two
distinct transactions T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ) and a hb-path π ∈
TXPathsn+1 (H ,T ,T ′).
Consider actions α1 and α2 such that the triple
(α1, xpotxwr(H ),α2) occurs the latest in π : there exist π ′
and π ′′ such that π = π ′ (α1, xpotxwr(H ),α2)π ′′ and there
is no triple (_, xpotxwr(H ), _) in π ′′. By denition of xpo(H )
and txwr(H ), there exists a transaction T1 and actions αbegin
and αwrite such that:
• αbegin denotes a beginning of a transaction T1;
• αwrite denotes a write request action by T1;
• α1 <po(H ) αbegin <po(H ) αwrite <txwr_(H ) α2 holds.
To conclude the induction step, we make the follow-
ing three observations. Firstly, note that the hb-path
π ′ (α1, po(H ),αwrite) ∈ TXPathsn (H ,T ,T1), and, there-
fore, T RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T1 holds by the induction hypothe-
sis Φ(n). Secondly, let T2 be the transaction of α2. Since
αwrite <txwr_(H ) α2 holds, so does T1
TXWR−−−−→ T2. Finally,
π ′′ ∈ TXPaths0 (H ,T2,T ′). By the induction hypothesis Φ(0),
T2
RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′ holds. Altogether, the three observations
imply T RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′. 
Proof of Theorem 6.6. Let us consider a DRF history H and
its graphG = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈ Graph(H ). Con-
sider a cycle π in G. Without loss of generality, we can as-
sume that all vertices on the cycle are distinct.
We rst consider the case when all nodes in the cycle π
are non-transactional accesses. Note that non-transactional
accesses of H are totally ordered by cl(H ). Knowing that
cl(H ) is consistent with the execution order <H of the history
H , we conclude that there cannot be such cycle π .
In order to construct a cycle π ′ over transactions only
with edges from RT ∪ DEP, we consider any two adjacent
transactions in the cycle π , i.e., such transactions T and T ′
that no other transaction appears betweenT andT ′. We then
demonstrate that in the opacity graphG , there is a path from
T to T ′ in RT ∪ DEP over transactions only, and we add the
path to π ′.
There are two possibilities: either T ′ immediately follows
T in the cycle, or they are separated by non-transactional
accesses.
When T ′ immediately follows T in the cycle π , the two
transactions are connected by an opacity graph edge HB ∪
DEP. If T HB−−→ T ′, then by Lemma B.11, T RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′, so
we add the latter edges to π ′. If T DEP−−−→ T ′, then we add the
same edge to π ′.
WhenT andT ′ are separated by other actions in the cycle
π , we consider a path between the two transactions:
T
HB∪DEP−−−−−−→ n1 HB∪DEP−−−−−−→ n2 HB∪DEP−−−−−−→ . . .
. . .
HB∪DEP−−−−−−→ nK HB∪DEP−−−−−−→ T ′, (4)
where each ni ∈ nontxn(H ) (i = 1..K ) is a node of the graph
G denoting a non-transactional access. By Lemma B.8, all
non-HB edges on the path can be replaced by HB:
T
HB−−→ n1 HB−−→ n2 HB−−→ . . . HB−−→ nK HB−−→ T ′
Therefore, T HB−−→ T ′ holds. By Lemma B.11, there is a se-
quence of edges T RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′. We add all of those edges
to the cycle π ′. 
Analogously to Theorem 6.6, we can prove the following
lemma. Let txWR, txWW, txRW denote WR, WW and RW
dependencies between transactions accordingly.
Lemma B.12. Let a data-race free history H and an opac-
ity graph G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈ Graph(H )
be such that the relation (HB ; (WR ∪ WW ∪ RW)) is
irreexive. If T
HB∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T ′ holds, then so does
T
RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T ′.
That is, if there exists a path over edgesHB∪WR∪WW∪
RW between two distinct transactionsT andT ′ of the graph
G, there also exists a path consisting only of edges from
RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW (note that RT edges are not
necessarily present in the graph G).
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1 Value clock, reg[NRegs], ver[NRegs];
2 Lock lock[NRegs];
3 Bool active[NThreads];
4 Set<Register> rset; // for each transaction
5 Map<Register, Value> wset; // for each transaction
6 Value rver; // for each transaction, initially ⊥
7 Value wver; // for each transaction, initially ⊤
8
9 function txbegin(Transaction T):
10 active[threadOf(T)] := true;
11 rver[T] := clock;
12 return;
13
14 function read(Transaction T, Register x):
15 if (wset[T].contains(x))
16 return wset[T].get(x);
17 ts1 := ver[x];
18 value := reg[x];
19 locked := lock[x].test();
20 ts2 := ver[x];
21 if (locked ∨ ts1 , ts2 ∨ rver[T] < ts2)
22 return abort(T);
23 rset[T].put(x);
24 return value;
25
26 function write(Transaction T, Register x, Value v):
27 wset[T].put(x, v);
28 return;
29
30 function fence():
31 Bool r[NThreads]; // initially all false
32 foreach t in ThreadID:
33 r[t] := active[t];
34 foreach t in ThreadID:
35 if (r[t]):
36 while (active[t]);
37 return;
30 function txcommit(Transaction T):
31 Set<Lock> lset := ∅;
32 foreach x in wset[T]:
33 Bool locked := lock[x].trylock();
34 if (¬locked):
35 lset.add(x);
36 else:
37 foreach y in lset[T]:
38 lock[y].unlock();
39 return abort(T);
40 wver[T] := fetch_and_increment(clock)+1;
41 foreach x in rset[T]:
42 Bool locked := lock[x].test();
43 atomic {
44 Value ts := ver[x];
45 pv[T][x] := ¬(locked ∨ rver[T] < ts);
46 }
47 if (locked ∨ rver[T] < ts):
48 foreach y in lset[T]:
49 lock[y].unlock();
50 return abort(T);
51 foreach (x, v) in wset[T]:
52 reg[x] := v;
53 ver[x] := wver[T];
54 lock[x].unlock();
55 return commit(T);
56
57 function abort(Transaction T):
58 return aborted;
59 active[threadOf(T)] := false;
60
61 function commit(Transaction T):
62 return committed;
63 active[threadOf(T)] := false;
Figure 9. TL2 pseudocode.
C Strong opacity of TL2
In this section, we provide details for the proof of strong opac-
ity of TL2. To this end, we rst argue that histories of TL2
are well-formed, and in the rest of the section we discharge
the proof obligations arising from graph characterization of
TL2 histories by means of Lemma 6.4 and Theorem 6.6.
C.1 Preliminaries
In Figure 9 we present the full pseudo-code of the TL2 soft-
ware TM implementation. In the code, we use NThreads to
denote the number of threads and threadOf(T ) to denote
the thread executing a given transaction T . We also let ⊥
and ⊤ denote special minimal and maximal values, which
rver[T ] and wver[T ] are initialized to (for every transaction
T ). The value ⊥ is also used to describe a state of a lock as
follows.We assume that the lock lock[x] of each register x is
either unlocked or stores an identier of a transaction hold-
ing the lock, i.e., Lock = {⊥} ⊎ Transaction. Thus, when
lock[x] = ⊥, the lock is not acquired by any transaction,
and when lock[x] = T , we know thatT is holding a lock on
x .
Functions txbegin, txcommit, write, read and fence
of the pseudocode generate corresponding request and re-
sponse actions from Figure 4 simultaneously with an invoca-
tion and return from the function accordingly. Additionally,
PPoPP ’18, February 24–28, 2018, Vienna, Austria Artem Khyzha, Hagit Aiya, Alexey Gotsman, and Noam Rinetzky
we assume that each transaction T upon aborting or com-
mitting executes a handler aborted(T ) or committed(T )
accordingly, both of which simply unset the active[t] ag
(at line 59 or line 63) after appending an abort-response or a
commit-response.
In the proof of strong opacity of TL2, we consider every
execution of the most general client of TL2. At each step
of it, we maintain a triple (s,H ,G ) consisting of a current
state s , a current history H and its matching opacity graph
G ∈ Graph(H ). In addition to these three components, for
every transactionT we also maintain a ghost variable pv[T ] :
Register → Bool that maps a register to true only ifT post-
validated a read from it. Ghost variables are dierent from
usual variables in that they do not describe the concrete state
of the execution, and are means to representing information
about the past of executions in proofs. For simplicity of
presentation, in the following we treat the pv variables as if
they were a part of concrete state.
C.2 Well-formedness of TL2 histories
We argue that the histories of TL2 are well-formed. The most
non-trivial well-formedness property of histories is that of
the fences, i.e., we need to show that:
• Fence blocks until all active transactions complete: if
τ = τ1 (_, t , txbegin) τ2 (_, t ′, fbegin) τ3 (_, t ′, fend) τ4
then either τ2 or τ3 contains an action of the form
(_, t , commied) or (_, t , aborted).
Let us consider the fence implementation at lines 30–36 of
Figure 9. The fence function consists of two loops: rst, it
iterates over all threads and records whether each thread t
has an active transaction in a local variable r[t]; and then
for each thread t , the fence waits until active[t] becomes
false, if r[t] is true.
Let us consider execution of a fence in a thread t ′ and let
A be the set of all active transactions at the beginning of
the execution of the fence. For each transaction T ∈ A in a
thread t , there are two possibilities:
• The transaction T commits (aborts) before the fence
checks active[t] for the rst time. Therefore, its
commit-response (_, t , commied) (abort-response
(_, t , aborted)) occurs before (_, t ′, fend) in a history
of the execution.
• The transaction T commits (aborts) after the fence
checks active[t] for the rst time, meaning that
active[t] = true at that point. When that is
the case, the fence sets r[t] to true. Later on at
line 36, the fence repeatedly re-reads the value of
active[t] until it observes false. Note that T will
append a commit-response (_, t , commied) (abort-
response (_, t , aborted)) to the history before setting
active[t] to false. Therefore, by the time the fence
reads false from active[t], theT ’s commit-response
(_, t , commied) (abort-response (_, t , aborted)) is al-
ready in the history, meaning that it occurs before
(_, t ′, fend).
Based on these observations, we conclude that fences block
until all active transactions complete, and that histories of
TL2 are well-formed.
C.3 Opacity graph construction
The construction of the graph is inductive in the length of
the execution of the most general client. At each step of
the construction, we maintain a triple (s,H ,G ) consisting
of the concrete state s , a history H and its opacity graph
G ∈ Graph(H ). We start from the initial state3 empty history
and an empty graph, and modify them as the execution
proceeds. To this end, simultaneously with certain primitive
commands of the TL2 algorithm in Figure 9 we execute graph
updates modifying the opacity graph.
In Figure 10, we specify all the changes each
graph update performs to an opacity graph
G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) of the triple (s,H ,G ).
The updates make use of auxiliary predicates reads(n,x ,v )
and writes(n,x ,v ), which we further dene:
• A predicate reads(n,x ,v ) holds of (s,H ,G ), if either
n ∈ N reads v from x non-transactionally or n ∈ N is
a transaction containing a non-local read of v from x .
• A predicate writes(n,x ,v ) holds of (s,H ,G ), if n
is a node of the graph G such that either n =
((_, _,write(x ,v )), (_, _, ret(⊥))) ∈ nontxn(H ) holds,
or n ∈ txns(H ) and its last write to x is
((_, _,write(x ,v )), (_, _, ret(⊥))).
We perform changes instructed by graph updates simultane-
ously with certain transitions of the TL2 algorithm, which
we further specify for each update:
• TXBEGIN(T ) occurs at the beginning of a transaction
T ;
• TXREAD(T ,x ,v ) occurs when a transaction T returns
a valuev at line 24, and a corresponding read response
is appended to the current history;
• TXVIS(T ) occurs simultaneously with the last transi-
tion of the loop at lines 41–50 in the transaction T ;
• NTXREAD(ν ,x ,v ) occurs when a non-transactional
read access ν reads a value v from a register x ;
• NTXWRITE(ν ,x ) occurs when a non-transactional
write access ν writes a value to a register x .
C.4 Invariants
Weprove strong opacity of TL2 by demonstrating that at each
step of the construction of an opacity graph characterized
by (s,H ,G ), where s is a concrete state, H is a history and
G is its matching opacity graph, the triple satises a global
3the state, in which every registers stores the initial value vinit and has a
version 0; clock stores 0; no lock is held and no transaction is active in any
thread.
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TXBEGIN(T ):
N := N ∪ {T };
vis(T ) := false;
HB := HB ∪ {n HB−−→ T | ∃α ∈ n,α ′ ∈ T . α <hb(H ) α ′};
TXREAD(T ,x ,v ):
if (v = vinit):
RW := RW ∪ {T RWx−−−−→ n | vis(n) ∧ writes(n,x , _)}
else:
WR := WR ∪ {n WRx−−−−→ T | writes(n,x ,v )};
RW := RW ∪ {T RWx−−−−→ n′ | writes(n,x ,v ) ∧ n WWx−−−−−→ n′};
HB := HB ∪ {n HB−−→ T | ∃T ′,n′.writes(T ′,x ,v )
∧ threadOf(T ′) = threadOf(n′)
∧ n HB−−→∗ n′ HB−−→ T ′};
TXVIS(T ):
vis(T ) := true;
foreach x in wset[T ]:
WW := WW ∪ {n WWx−−−−−→ T | n , T ∧ vis(n)
∧ writes(n,x , _)};
RW := RW ∪ {n RWx−−−−→ T | n , T ∧ reads(n,x , _)};
NTXREAD(ν ,x ,v ):
N := N ∪ {ν };
vis(ν ) := true;
if (v , vinit):
WR := WR ∪ {n WRx−−−−→ T | writes(n,x ,v )};
HB := HB ∪ {n HB−−→ T | ∃α ∈ n,α ′ ∈ ν . α <hb(H ) α ′};
NTXWRITE(ν ,x ):
N := N ∪ {ν };
vis(ν ) := true;
WW := WW ∪ {n WWx−−−−−→ ν | n , ν ∧ vis(n) ∧ writes(n,x , _)};
RW := RW ∪ {n RWx−−−−→ ν | n , ν ∧ reads(n,x , _)};
HB := HB ∪ {n HB−−→ ν | ∃α ∈ n,α ′ ∈ ν . α <hb(H ) α ′};
Figure 10. Description of graph updates
invariant presented in Figure 11. The invariant makes use of
the following auxiliary denitions:
• Given a relation R on a set of graph nodes and a node
n, we say that isLastIn(R,n) holds, if R is a linear order
and n is the last node in R.
• We let completed(T ) be a predicate that holds of
(s,H ,G ), if T ∈ txns(H ) is a committed or aborted
transaction. We also introduce a predicate aborted(T )
that holds of (s,H ,G ), whenT ∈ txns(H ) is an aborted
transaction.
Themost important invariant properties correspond to the
proof obligations arising from Lemma 6.4 and Theorem 6.6.
Recall that we need to demonstrate that for a history H ∈
HC |DRF and the graph G ∈ Graph(H ) that we construct, the
following holds:
1. H is consistent;
2. if G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW), then the relation
(HB ; (WR ∪WW ∪ RW)) is irreexive;
3. G does not contain a cycle over transactions only with
edges from RT ∪WR ∪WW ∪ RW.
The obligations 1–3 are discharged by proving invariants
INV.2, INV.3 and INV.4 accordingly. In the following, we
explain each part of the invariant.
The invariant INV.1 requires that histories be data-race
free, since we only need to consider histories fromHC |DRF in
the proof. The invariant INV.2(a) asserts consistency of TL2
histories, while INV.2(b) is an auxiliary property relating
a predicate writes(_, _, _) with the content of write-sets of
transactions. The invariant INV.3 requires that (HB ; (WR∪
WW ∪ RW)) be irreexive. The invariant INV.4 asserts that
the opacity graphG does not contain cycles over transactions
in (RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW). By Theorem 6.6, together
the latter two invariants imply that the graph G is acyclic.
The invariants mentioned so far are not inductive, so we
strengthen them with additional auxiliary invariants. To
this end, INV.5 relates the order of timestamps to the edges
of the opacity graph. In order to maintain this invariant
inductively, we include an additional invariant INV.6, which
helps to establish that INV.5(c–e) are preserved by the graph
update TXVIS(_). To this end, it asserts the properties of
every commit-pending transaction T ′ that has acquired a
lock on a register, but has not added corresponding write
and anti-dependencies yet.
The invariant INV.7 asserts various well-formedness prop-
erties of read and write timestamps of each transaction, and
the invariant INV.8 asserts multiple well-formedness condi-
tions relating the concrete state, history actions and graph
edges.
Lemma C.1. The invariant INV is preserved by the
graph updates TXREAD(T ,x ), TXVIS(T ), NTXREAD(ν ),
NTXWRITE(ν ) and TXBEGIN(T ).
The invariant INV.1 does not require a proof of preser-
vation. Indeed, in the Fundamental Property (Theorem 5.3)
data-race freedom is an obligation that clients of a TM sys-
tem need to fulll, not a TM implementation. Hence, in the
proof of strong opacity of TL2, INV.1 is an assumption. Also,
it is easy to see that the well-formedness conditions of INV.7
and INV.8 are preserved trivially by construction of histo-
ries and graphs. We provide proof details for the remaining
invariants in the following sections:
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INV denotes the smallest set of triples (s,H ,G ) of a concrete state s , a history H and an opacity graph G =
(N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) ∈ Graph(H ), all satisfying the following:
1. The history H is data-race free.
2. Consistency invariants:
a. H is a consistent history.
b. The write-set of each transaction T consists of its most recent writes to registers:
∀T ∈ txns(H ),x ∈ Reg,v ∈ Z. (x ,v ) ∈ wset[T ] ⇐⇒ writes(T ,x ,v )
3. The relation (HB ; (WR ∪WW ∪ RW)) is irreexive.
4. The relation (RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW) is acyclic.
5. Read and write timestamps of transactions have the following properties:
a. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T RT−−→ T ′ =⇒ ((vis(T ) =⇒ wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′]) ∧ (¬vis(T ) =⇒ rver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′]))
∨ rver[T ′] = ⊥
b. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T WR−−→ T ′ =⇒ wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′]
c. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T WW−−−→ T ′ =⇒ wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
d. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T RW−−→ T ′ =⇒ rver[T ] < wver[T ′]
e. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T RWx−−−→ T ′ ∧ pv[T ][x] = true =⇒ wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
6. Commit-pending transaction T ′ has the following properties:
a. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ),x ∈ Reg.T , T ′ ∧ writes(T ,x ) ∧ vis(T ) ∧ lock[x] = T ′ =⇒ wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
b. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ),x ∈ Reg.T , T ′ ∧ reads(T ,x , _) ∧ lock[x] = T ′ =⇒ rver[T ] < wver[T ′]
c. ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ),x ∈ Reg.T , T ′ ∧ pv[T ][x] = true ∧ lock[x] = T ′ =⇒ wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
7. Well-formedness properties of read and write timestamps:
a. ∀T ∈ txns(H ). rver[T ] < wver[T ]
b. ∀T ∈ txns(H ). rver[T ] ≤ clock ∧ (wver[T ] = ⊤ ∨ wver[T ] ≤ clock)
c. ∀T ∈ txns(H ). wver[T ] , ⊤ =⇒ rver[T ] , ⊥
d. ∀T ∈ txns(H ). reads(T , _, _) =⇒ rver[T ] , ⊥)
e. ∀T ∈ txns(H ). (∃x . pv[T ][x] = true) ∨ vis(T ) =⇒ wver[T ] , ⊤
8. Auxiliary invariants:
a. The value of each unlocked register x is ether the initial vinit or the value written by the last node inWWx .
∀x ∈ Reg. lock[x] = ⊥ =⇒ (reg[x] = vinit ⇐⇒ ¬∃n. vis(n) ∧ writes(n,x , _))
∧ (reg[x] , vinit ⇐⇒ ∃n. isLastIn(WWx ,n) ∧ writes(n,x , reg[x]))
b. The version of each unlocked register x is either the initial version vinit or the write timestamp of the last transaction
in txWWx .
∀x ∈ Reg. lock[x] = ⊥ =⇒ (ver[x] = vinit ⇐⇒ ¬∃T ∈ txns(H ). vis(T ) ∧ writes(T ,x , _))
∧ (ver[x] , vinit ⇐⇒ ∃T ∈ txns(H ). isLastIn(txWWx ,T ) ∧ ver[x] = wver[T ])
c. Visible transactions have their reads post-validated:
∀T ∈ txns(H ),x ∈ Reg. vis(T ) ∧ reads(T ,x , _) =⇒ pv[T ][x] = true
d. HB-edges do not originate from active transactions:
∀T ∈ txns(H ).¬completed(T ) =⇒ ¬∃n′.T HB−−→ n′
e. A transaction holding a lock on a register is not completed and writes to that register and is not overwritten:
∀x ∈ Reg,T ∈ txns(H ). lock[x] = T =⇒ ¬completed(T ) ∧ writes(T ,x , _) ∧ ¬∃T .T WWx−−−−→ T ′
Figure 11. The TL2 invariant
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Section # Invariant
Section C.6 INV.2
Section C.7 INV.3
Section C.8 INV.5
Section C.9 INV.4
Section C.10 INV.6
Note that we are considering the invariants out of the as-
cending order due to Section C.9 depending on Section C.8.
C.5 Timestamp order properties
We state Proposition C.2, which relates paths between trans-
actions with timestamp order, and then we use it in multiple
proofs of preservation of the invariant.
Proposition C.2. If (s,H ,G ) satises INV.5, INV.7 and
INV.8, then for every transactions T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ), if
T
RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T ′, then either of the following holds:
1. vis(T ) ∧ vis(T ′) =⇒ wver[T ] < wver[T ′];
2. ¬vis(T ) ∧ vis(T ′) =⇒ rver[T ] < wver[T ′];
3. vis(T ) ∧ ¬vis(T ′) =⇒ wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] ∨
rver[T ′] = ⊥;
4. ¬vis(T ) ∧ ¬vis(T ′) =⇒ rver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] ∨
rver[T ′] = ⊥.
Proof of Proposition C.2. The proof is by induction on the
length of the path T RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T ′. Let ϕ1 (T ,T ′),
ϕ2 (T ,T
′), ϕ3 (T ,T ′) and ϕ4 (T ,T ′) be predicates correspond-
ing to the implications of the proposition. For each k ≥ 1,
we prove Φ(k ), which is dened as follows:
Φ(k ) , ∀T ,T ′ ∈ txns(H ).T RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→k T ′
=⇒ ϕ1 (T ,T ′) ∧ ϕ2 (T ,T ′) ∧ ϕ3 (T ,T ′) ∧ ϕ4 (T ,T ′)
Base of induction.We need to show that Φ(1) holds. Let us
consider any two transactions T and T ′ in the opacity graph
and assume that T RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ T ′ holds. We consider
each possible edge separately and demonstrate ϕ1 (T ,T ′),
ϕ2 (T ,T
′), ϕ3 (T ,T ′) or ϕ4 (T ,T ′) depending on visibility of T
and T ′.
1. Consider the edgeT RT−−→ T ′. According to the invariant
INV.5(a), we consider make the following conclusions
depending on visibility of T and T ′.
• Let us assume that both T and T ′ are visible. We
demonstrate that ϕ1 (T ,T ′) holds. From the invari-
ant INV.5(a), we know that either wver[T ] ≤
rver[T ′] or rver[T ′] = ⊥ is the case. Note that the
contra-positive of the invariant INV.7(c,e) states that
rver[T ′] = ⊥ contradicts visibility of T ′. Therefore,
only wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] can hold in this case. By
INV.7(a), rver[T ′] < wver[T ′] holds, which allows
us to conclude wver[T ] ≤ wver[T ′] (coinciding with
ϕ1 (T ,T
′)).
• Let us assume that T is not visible and T ′ is.
We demonstrate that ϕ2 (T ,T ′) holds. From the in-
variant INV.5(a), we know that either rver[T ] ≤
rver[T ′] or rver[T ′] = ⊥ is the case. Note that the
contra-positive of the invariant INV.7(c,e) states that
rver[T ′] = ⊥ contradicts visibility of T ′. Therefore,
only rver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] can hold in this case. By
INV.7(a), rver[T ′] < wver[T ′] holds, which allows
us to conclude rver[T ] < wver[T ′] (coinciding with
ϕ2 (T ,T
′)).
• Let us assume thatT is visible andT ′ is not. It is easy
to see that ϕ3 (T ,T ′) holds, since, by INV.5(a), either
wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] or rver[T ′] = ⊥ is true.
• Let us assume that neither T nor T ′ is visible. It is
easy to see that ϕ4 (T ,T ′) holds, since, by INV.5(a),
either rver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] or rver[T ′] = ⊥ is true.
2. T WR−−→ T ′. By Denition 6.3, vis(T ) holds. From in-
variant INV.5(b), we obtain that wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′]
holds. Hence, if vis(T ′) does not hold, we can conclude
ϕ3 (T ,T
′). Let us consider the case when vis(T ′) holds.
By INV.7(a), rver[T ′] < wver[T ′] holds. Therefore,
wver[T ] < wver[T ′] holds, which allows us to con-
clude ϕ1 (T ,T ′).
3. T WW−−−→ T ′. By Denition 6.3, vis(T ) and vis(T ′) both
hold. By invariant INV.5(c), wver[T ] ≤ wver[T ′] holds,
which allows us to conclude ϕ1 (T ,T ′).
4. T RW−−→ T ′. By Denition 6.3, vis(T ′) holds. Let us
rst assume that vis(T ) does not hold. By INV.5(d),
rver[T ] < wver[T ′] holds, which allows us to con-
clude ϕ2 (T ,T ′). Let us now consider the case when
vis(T ) holds. By INV.8(c), T post-validated all of its
reads. Therefore, by INV.5(e), wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
holds, which allows us to conclude ϕ1 (T ,T ′)
Induction step. Let us consider any k ≥ 1 and assume that
Φ(k ′) holds for all k ′ ≤ k , i.e.:
∀T ,T ′.T RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→k ′ T ′
=⇒ ϕ1 (T ,T ′) ∧ ϕ2 (T ,T ′) (5)
We need to show that Φ(k + 1) holds too. To this end, we
consider any path T RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→k+1 T ′.
Let T ′′ be the next transaction after T on the path, i.e.,
such that T RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ T ′′ RT∪txWR∪txWW∪txRW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→k
T ′. It is easy to see that Φ(k + 1) can be obtained from the
induction hypotheses Φ(1) (instantiated for T and T ′′) and
Φ(k ) (instantiated for T ′′ and T ′). 
C.5.1 Anti-dependencies of read updates
We now formulate and establish a property of
anti-dependency edges added at the graph update
TXREAD(T ,x ,v ), which we use in proofs of preservation of
several invariants. To this end, we introduce an auxiliary
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predicate PAD(T ,x ,v ) denoting a set of triples (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′)
such that:
• in the history H ′′, T is a transaction whose last action
is a read request (_, _, read(x ));
• if v = vinit holds, then
∀n′.writes(n′,x , _) ∧ ¬aborted(n′) =⇒
(n′ ∈ txns(H )) ∧ rver[T ] < wver[n′]
• if v , vinit holds, then there exists a node n such that
vis(n), writes(n,x ,v ) and the following all hold:
∀n′.writes(n′,x , _) ∧ ¬aborted(n′) ∧ ¬n′ WWx−−−−→ n =⇒
(n′ ∈ txns(H )) ∧ rver[T ] < wver[n′]
The following proposition asserts that PAD(T ,x ,v ) is stable
under interference from other threads, i.e., transitions and
graph updates of other threads do not invalidate it.
Proposition C.3. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ PAD(T ,x ,v ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of a graph update or a tran-
sition in a thread dierent from threadOf(T ), then
(s ′,H ′,G ′) ∈ PAD(T ,x ,v ).
Proof. Note that opacity graphs are constructed
monotonously, i.e., once we add an edge, it stays in
the graph. Hence, in a proof of stability of PAD(T ,x ,v ) it is
important to consider only graph updates NTXWRITE(n′,x )
and TXVIS(n′), since they introduce new nodes writing to
x , which PAD(T ,x ,v ) requires to have a timestamp greater
than rver[T ]. Out of all primitive commands by other
threads, we only consider the ones at line 28 and at line 40
(the rest of primitive commands preserve PAD(T ,x ,v )
trivially).
Firstly, we consider the graph update NTXWRITE(n′,x ),
which adds a new non-transactional node n′ writing to x .
Since we only consider data-race free histories in our proof
of TL2, either n′ HB−−→ T or T HB−−→ n′ must occur in G ′. The
former cannot be the case, since n′ is a new node, and the
graph update only adds edges ending in n′. Also, T is a live
transaction, so by INV.8(d), T HB−−→ n′ cannot be in G ′.
Secondly, we consider a primitive command at line 28,
which happens when a transaction T ′ writes to the register
x and results in adding a corresponding write response into
the history. Hence, after this command, writes(T ′,x , _) and
¬aborted(T ′) both hold. Note that whenT reads a non-initial
value written by a node n, ¬(T ′ WWx−−−−→ n) also holds, since
T ′ is not visible. Additionally, T ′ is also live, meaning that it
has not generated its write timestamp yet, i.e., wver[T ′] = ⊤
holds. Therefore, PAD(T ,x ,v ) holds too.
Thirdly, we now consider the primitive command at line 40
occurring in some transaction T ′ writing to x . The primi-
tive command replaces previously maximal write timestamp
wver[T ′] with the incremented value of clock. By INV.7(b),
all other read and write timestamps, such as rver[T ], are less
or equal to clock in (s,H ,G ). Hence, rver[T ] < wver[n′]
holds after the primitive command executes.
Lastly, we consider TXVIS(n′) occurring in a transaction
n′ writing to x . Knowing that (s,H ,G ) ∈ PAD(T ,x ,v ), we
get that rver[T ] < wver[n′] holds. Since the graph update
simply makes n′ visible, PAD(T ,x ,v ) holds. 
We now prove the property of anti-dependencies added
at the graph update TXREAD(T ,x ,v ).
Proposition C.4. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV, T ∈ txns(H ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of a graph update TXREAD(T ,x ,v ), then
for every anti-dependencyT
WRx−−−→ n added by the update, both
n ∈ txns(H ′) and rver[T ] < wver[n] hold of (s ′,H ′,G ′).
Proof. Before the graph update, the read operation stores
the value of ver[x] into a local variable ts1, then it stores
reg[x] in a local variable value as well as the lock status
lock[x].test() in locked. Afterwards, the read operation
stores the value of ver[x] once again into a local variable
ts2. The graph update TXREAD(T ,x ) happens provided that
the following holds of (s,H ,G ) prior to the update:
¬locked ∧ ts1 = ts2 ∧ ts2 ≤ rver[T ] (6)
Note that by checking the above, the read operation ensures
that there was a moment in between the two accesses to
ver[x], when ver[x] = ts1 = ts2, reg[x] = value and
lock[x] = ⊥ all simultaneously held. Let (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′) corre-
spond to that moment. Since that is the past of the execution,
(s ′′,H ′′,G ′′) ∈ INV holds.
In the following, we demonstrate that PAD(T ,x ,v ) holds
of (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′). Once that is established, Proposition C.3
will ensure that PAD(T ,x ,v ) is not invalidated till the read
operation returns and the graph update executes.
Let us assume that T reads the initial value, i.e. value =
vinit. Note that reg[x] = vinit holds of (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′). By
INV.8(a,b), there is no visible node in G ′′ that writes to x .
Hence, PAD(T ,x ,v ) holds trivially of (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′). Now let
us consider the case when T does not read an initial value,
i.e., value , vinit. Note that reg[x] = value , vinit holds
of (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′). By INV.8(b), n is last inWWx . Once again,
PAD(T ,x ,v ) holds trivially of (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′), since no node n′
follows n inWWx . 
Corollary C.5. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV, T ∈ txns(H ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of a graph update TXREAD(T ,x ,v ), then
for every anti-dependencyT
WRx−−−→ n added by the update, both
n ∈ txns(H ′) and rver[T ] < wver[n] hold of (s ′,H ′,G ′).
Proof sketch. Note that the graph update TXREAD(T ,x ,v )
adds the following anti-dependency edges into G:
• if v = vinit, then {T RWx−−−→ n | vis(n) ∧ writes(n,x , _)};
• otherwise, {T RWx−−−→ n′ | writes(n′,x ,v ) ∧ n′ WWx−−−−→ n}.
Thus, it is sucient to prove that PAD(T ,x ,v ) holds of
(s ′,H ′,G ′). This follows from Proposition C.4. 
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C.6 Preservation of INV.2
It is easy to see that the invariants INV.2(b,c) hold by con-
struction of the history. In the following, we argue that
INV.2(a) is preserved throughout each execution.
In order to ensure consistency of a history H , according
to Denition 6.2, we need to demonstrate the following for
every read request α = (_, _, read(x )) and its matching re-
sponse α ′ = (_, _, ret(v )):
• when (α ,α ′) ∈ Local(H ) and performed by a transac-
tion T , v is the value written by the most recent write
(_, _,write(x ,v )) preceding the read in T ;
• when (α ,α ′) < Local(H ), there exists a non-local β
not located in an aborted or live transaction and such
that β <wrx (H ) α ′; if there is no such write, v = vinit.
It is easy to see that it is sucient to ensure preservation of
consistency only when we add read-response actions into
history, which happens at line 16 or line 24 of the read
function.
Let us consider any transaction T that initiated a read op-
eration from a register x (the case of a non-transactional read
is analogous to a non-local read by a transaction). The last
action by T in history is a read-request α = (_, _, read(x )).
Let a corresponding read response be α ′ = (_, _, ret(v )) and
consider the moment it is added into historyH , which results
in a history H ′.
We rst consider the case when (α ,α ′) ∈ Local(H ) holds.
By Denition 6.1, T writes to x before α . Let v ′ be the value
of the last such write; thenwrites(T ,x ,v ′) holds ofH andH ′.
By INV.2(b), (x ,v ′) ∈ wset[T ]. Note that (x ,v ′) ∈ wset[T ]
holds during the entire read operation, because wset[T ] is a
local variable of transaction T . It is easy to see that in this
case the read operation returns a value from the write-set at
line 16, meaning that v = v ′.
We now consider the case when (α ,α ′) < Local(H ) holds.
By Denition 6.1, T does not write to x before α , meaning
that there is no value v ′ such that writes(T ,x ,v ′) holds of
history during the execution of the read operation. Hence, by
INV.2(b), wset[T ] does not contain a value for x . Moreover,
the latter is the case during the entire read operation, because
wset[T ] is a local variable of transaction T . It is easy to see
that in this case the read operation at line 24 returns the value
v read directly from the register; however, the result of the
operation is determined at line 20. Based on INV.8(a) (note
that the read operation ensures that lock[x] is unlocked),
the following two observations can be made about the value
v at the moment of executing line 20:
1. v , vinit if and only if there exists a node n such that
isLastIn(WWx ,n) and writes(n,x ,v ) both hold;
2. v = vinit if and only if there is no visible node writing
to x .
First, let us consider the case when there exists a node n such
that isLastIn(WWx ,n) and writes(n,x ,v ) both hold. Since
it is ordered by WWx , by Denition 6.3, it is visible, and,
therefore, does not denote a live or an aborted transaction.
According to writes(n,x ,v ), n contains a non-local write
action β writing v to x . Thus, β <wrx (H ′) α ′ holds. Overall,
in this case, if (α ,α ′) < Local(H ′) and v , vinit, then there
exists a non-local β ∈ n, which is not an aborted or live
transaction, such that β <wrx (H ) α ′.
We now consider the case when there does not exist a
visible node writing to x , which is when v = vinit. Thus, any
node n writing to x must be either a live, aborted or commit-
pending non-visible transaction. Additionally, in case of the
latter, if β is the non-local write to x by n, β <wrx (H ′) α ′
does not hold, since α ′ returns v = vinit and β writes a non-
initial value4. Overall, in this case, if (α ,α ′) < Local(H ′) and
v = vinit, then there does not exists a non-local β not located
in an aborted or live transaction and such that β <wrx (H ) α ′.
C.7 Preservation of INV.3
Proposition C.6. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV and (s ′,H ′,G ′) is a
result adding a new node n by graph updates TXBEGIN(n),
NTXREAD(n, _) or NTXWRITE(n, _), the following observa-
tion holds of (s ′,H ′,G ′): ¬∃n′.n HB∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n′.
Proof sketch. The proof of the proposition is almost triv-
ial, as TXBEGIN(n) and NTXWRITE(n, _) always order
new graph nodes after existing ones. The same is true of
NTXREAD(n,x ) as well (for every register x ), however, it is
necessary to demonstrate that this graph update does not
introduce anti-dependencies originating in n.
We consider the register x . Let us rst assume that it is
locked at the moment of the graph update NTXREAD(n,x ),
i.e., there exists a transaction T such that lock[x] = T . By
INV.8(e),T writes to x , and, therefore, conicts with n. Since
we only consider data-race free histories, it must be the
case that either T HB−−→ n or n HB−−→ T . However, neither is
possible: the former, because according to INV.8(d,e) T is
not completed and therefore cannot have outgoing happens-
before edges, and the latter, because n is a fresh node, and
NTXREAD(n,x ) does not introduce edges of the form n HB−−→
_. Thus, we obtained a contradiction. We conclude that x is
not locked at the moment of the graph update.
When lock[x] = ⊥, by INV.8(a), the value of reg[x] is
either the value written by the last node in WWx or vinit,
if there is no such node. Thus, it is easy to see that in both
cases no anti-dependency of the form n
RWx−−−→ _ is added into
G by NTXREAD(n,x ). 
Proposition C.7. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV and (s ′,H ′,G ′) is a re-
sult of a graph update, then (s ′,H ′,G ′) satises INV.3.
Proof. We consider all possible graph updates separately in
the four following cases.
Case 1: non-transactional graph update NTXWRITE(ν , _)
or NTXREAD(ν , _). Both updates add a new node ν to the
4See well-formedness conditions for traces in errata of Section 2.2
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graph, which by Proposition C.6 does not have outgoing
edges. Hence, it is easy to see that (HB ; (WR∪WW∪RW))
remains irreexive after either of the graph updates.
Case 2: transactional graph update TXBEGIN(T ). This up-
date adds a new node T to the graph and happens-before
edges of the following form: _ HB−−→ T . Note that by Proposi-
tion C.6, no edge starts from T . Hence, it is easy to see that
(HB ; (WR∪WW∪RW)) remains irreexive after the graph
update.
Case 3: transactional graph update TXVIS(T ). It adds
edges only of the following form: _ WW−−−→ T and _ RW−−→ T .
Adding such edges cannot invalidate irreexivity of (HB ;
(WR ∪ WW ∪ RW)), unless there is a node n such that
T
HB−−→ n holds of (s,H ,G ). However, by invariant INV.8(d),
HB-edges do not originate in T , so we can conclude that
(HB ; (WR∪WW∪RW)) remains irreexive after TXVIS(T ).
Case 4: transactional graph update TXREAD(T ,x , _). Ac-
cording to Figure 10, it adds edges of the form _
WRx−−−→ T ,
T
RWx−−−→ _ and _ HB−−→ T . Note that the transactionT is not com-
pleted at the moment (s,H ,G ). Hence, by invariant INV.8(d),
HB-edges do not originate from T prior to the update. The
transaction T is also not visible at the moment of the graph
update, so WW and WR-edges do not originate from T ei-
ther according to Denition 6.3. Therefore, the only kind of
edges going from T inG and G ′ is anti-dependencies of the
formT RW−−→ _. We need to demonstrate that there is no node
n such that a cycle T RW−−→ n HB−−→ T appears in G ′ after the
graph update. To this end, we consider three possibilities:
1. only the edge T
RWx−−−→ n is added by the graph update,
and n HB−−→ T is present in G;
2. only the edge n HB−−→ T is added by the graph update,
and T
RWy−−−→ n is present in G (for some register y);
3. edges T
RWx−−−→ n and n HB−−→ T are both added by the
graph update.
We start with the rst potential cycle, and demonstrate by
contradiction that it never takes place. By Proposition C.4, n
is a transaction and rver[T ] < wver[n]. Since n is a transac-
tion, Lemma B.11 gives us that there is a path n RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T
in the graph G. Recall that T is not visible and, according to
the denition of TXREAD(T ,x , _) in Figure 10, n is visible.
By applying Proposition C.8 to the path n RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T , we
learn that either wver[n] ≤ rver[T ] or rver[T ] = ⊥ holds
of (s,H ,G ). However, at the moment of the graph update,
transactions already have generated their read timestamps,
meaning that only wver[n] ≤ rver[T ] can be the case. Thus,
we arrived to a contradiction.
We now consider the second potential cycle, and demon-
strate by contradiction that it is never added. Let us assume
thatT
RWy−−−→ n is in the graphG . Hence, by denition of RWy ,
T must have already read from y, from which we conclude
that y , x . We also assume that the edge n hb−→ T is added by
the graph update, which, according to Figure 10, only hap-
pens when T ′ is a transaction from which T reads from and
there is a node n′ in the thread of T ′ such that the following
conguration takes place:
n
HB∗
xx
HB

__
RWyn
′
HB

T ′
WRx // T
where the solid lines depict edges present in the original
graph G, and the dotted lines are new edges added by the
graph update. We consider two possibilities depending on
whether n represents a transaction or not. Let us rst assume
it is a transaction. By Lemma B.11, n RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′ holds of
the graphG . By applying Proposition C.8 to the pathT
RWy−−−→
n
RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′, we learn that rver[T ] < wver[T ′]. How-
ever, the graph update happens only if wver[T ′] ≤ rver[T ],
meaning that this possibility never arises. Let us now as-
sume that n is non-transactional. Since H is data-race free,
eitherT HB−−→ n or n HB−−→ T is the case for the graphG . Know-
ing that (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV.3 and that T RWy−−−→ n is in G, we
conclude that only T HB−−→ n is possible. Hence, T HB−−→ T ′
holds, and, by Lemma B.11, so does T RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′. By
applying Proposition C.8 to the latter path, we learn that
rver[T ] < wver[T ′]. However, the graph update happens
only if wver[T ′] ≤ rver[T ], meaning that this possibility
never arises.
Finally, we consider the last possible cycle, and demon-
strate by contradiction that it is never added. Let us assume
that the edges T
RWx−−−→ n and n HB−−→ T are both added by the
graph update and form a cycle. This is only possible if the
following conguration (analogous to the case of the second
cycle) takes place:
n
HB∗
xx
HB

__
RWxn
′
HB

T ′
WRx // T
where the solid lines depict edges present in the original
graph G, and the dotted lines are new edges added by the
graph update. By Proposition C.4, n is a transaction and
rver[T ] < wver[n]. By Lemma B.11, n RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+ T ′ holds
of the graph G. Note that n is visible transaction, and T is
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not. By applying Proposition C.8 to the path n RT∪TXWR−−−−−−−→+
T ′
WRx−−−→ T , we learn that either wver[n] ≤ rver[T ] or
rver[T ] = ⊥. However, the latter cannot be the case at
the moment of the graph update. Hence, we obtained a con-
tradiction: rver[T ] < wver[n] and wver[n] ≤ rver[T ] both
hold. 
C.8 Preservation of INV.5
Proposition C.8. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV, T ∈ txns(H ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of a graph update, then (s ′,H ′,G ′) sat-
ises INV.5.
Proof. Graph updates NTXREAD(_, _) and NTXWRITE(_, _)
do not aect the invariant. Therefore, we consider the fol-
lowing cases in the proof: graph updates TXBEGIN(T ′),
TXREAD(T ′,x ), TXVIS(T ′) and also primitive commands at
at line 11, line 45 and line 40 in Figure 9. We consider prim-
itive commands in the proof, because the ones at line 11
and line 40 may change the implication of INV.5 for existing
nodes and edges satisfying its premise, meaning that we
need to prove that the implication remains true. The rest of
the graph updates may add new nodes and edges satisfying
the premise of the invariant, so we demonstrate that the
implication holds of them too.
We rst consider a primitive command at line 11 assign-
ing a read version to a transaction T ′, which happens only
when rver[T ′] = ⊥. As follows from invariants INV.7(c,d,e),
in order to have the minimal read timestamp T ′ must be
neither visible nor have non-locally read from any regis-
ter. This is not the case for transactions in the invariants
INV.5(b-e), so we focus on the invariant INV.5(a). Let us
consider a transaction T such that T RT−−→ T ′ holds. By in-
variant INV.7(b), rver[T ] ≤ clock and either wver[T ] = ⊤
or wver[T ] ≤ clock. Let us assume that vis(T ) holds. By
INV.7(e), wver[T ] , ⊤, so only wver[T ] ≤ clock is possible.
Since the new value of rver[T ′] is clock, it is the case that
wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′], meaning that the invariant INV.5(a) is
preserved. Let us now consider the case when vis(T ) does
not hold. Knowing that rver[T ] ≤ clock and that the new
value of rver[T ′] is clock, we conclude rver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′],
which means that the invariant INV.5(a) is preserved.
Second, we consider a primitive command at line 40 as-
signing a write timestamp to a transaction, which happens
only when the transaction has the write timestamp ⊤. The
contra-positive of INV.7(e) states that such transaction is
not visible. Note that every occurrence of wver[·] in INV.5
corresponds to a visible transaction. Therefore, line 40 does
not invalidate INV.5.
Third, we consider a graph update TXBEGIN(T ′). This
graph update adds a new node corresponding to the transac-
tion T ′. We also need to consider real-time order between
completed transactions andT ′. LetT be any completed trans-
action such that T RT−−→ T ′. Since rver[T ′] is initialized with
rver[T ′] = ⊥, INV.6(a) holds trivially.
Forth, we consider a graph update TXREAD(T ′,x , _)
adding read and anti-dependencies between transaction. Let
us rst consider the new read dependency T
WRx−−−→ T ′. Since
the graph update only happens if wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] holds,
the invariant INV.5 is not invalidated by adding the new read
dependency. We now consider any new anti-dependency
T ′
RWx−−−→ T ′′. By Proposition C.4, rver[T ′] < wver[T ′′],
meaning that INV.5(d) is preserved too.
Fifth, we consider a graph update TXVIS(T ′). Let us con-
sider any new edge T
WWx∪RWx−−−−−−−−−→ T ′. Since the transaction
T ′ rst locks registers of its write-set and then performs
TXVIS(T ′), lock[x] = T ′ holds at the moment of the graph
update. Preservation of INV.5(c–e) by the graph update then
follows immediately from INV.6(a–c) accordingly.
Finally, we consider a possibility of a primitive command
by T at line 45 setting pv[T ][x] to true for some register x .
Let us assume that there exists a transaction T ′ such that
T
RWx−−−→ T ′ holds prior to the execution of line 45 (if there
are several such transactions, we let T ′ be the one occur-
ring the last in WWx ). By INV.5(d), rver[T ] < wver[T ′]
holds then. Note that line 45 sets pv[T ][x] to true only if
lock[x] = ⊥ and ts ≤ rver[T ], where ts = ver[x]. By
INV.8(b), ver[x] = wver[T ′]. As a consequence, wver[T ′] ≤
rver[T ] holds, which contradicts our previous observation
about wver[T ′] and rver[T ]. Hence, there does not exist a
transactionT ′ such thatT
RWx−−−→ T ′, and INV.5(e) is preserved
by the primitive command at line 45. 
C.9 Preservation of INV.4
In this section, we demonstrate that all graph updates pre-
serve the invariant INV.4. To this end, rstly, we observe
that graph updatesNTXREAD(_, _) andNTXWRITE(_, _) do
not introduce edges between pairs of transactions and there-
fore cannot possibly invalidate INV.4. Secondly, we argue
that the graph update TXINIT(T ), which adds a new transac-
tion T into the graph and implies new real-time order edges
between transactions ending in T , also straightforwardly
preserves INV.4. As we previously demonstrated in Proposi-
tion C.6, no edges originate from the new transaction T , so
it is easy to see that the graph update does not introduce any
cycle and, thus, preserves INV.4. In the rest of the section,
we consider the remaining graph updates TXREAD(_, _) and
TXVIS(_), we prove Proposition C.9 and Proposition C.10.
Proposition C.9. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV, T ′ ∈ txns(H ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of a graph update TXREAD(T ′,x ), then
(s ′,H ′,G ′) satises INV.4.
Proof. Before the graph update, the read operation stores
the value of ver[x] into a local variable ts1, then it stores
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reg[x] in a local variable value as well as the lock status
lock[x].test() in locked. Afterwards, when the read op-
eration stores the value of ver[x] once again into a local
variable ts2, the graph update TXREAD(T ′,x ) may happen,
provided that the following holds of (s,H ,G ) prior to the
update:
¬locked ∧ ts1 = ts2 ∧ ts2 ≤ rver[T ′] (7)
Note that by checking the above, the read operation ensures
that there was a moment in between the two accesses to
ver[x], when ver[x] = ts1 = ts2, reg[x] = value and
lock[x] = ⊥ all simultaneously held. Let (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′) cor-
respond to that moment.
Let us assume that the condition (7) holds, and the graph
update takes place. Since TXREAD(T ′,x ) adds dierent edges
depending onwhether value = vinit holds, we consider these
two cases in the proof separately.
Firstly, we consider the case when value = vinit holds. Ac-
cording to Figure 10, only RW edges are added into the graph
in this case. We prove that such edges do not create cycles by
contradiction. Let us imagine a cycle in the graph G ′ going
through a new anti-dependency edge T ′
RWx−−−→ T ′′. The path
T ′′
RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T ′ is present in the graph G. Hence,
after applying Proposition C.2 to visible T ′′ and non-visible
T ′, we obtain that wver[T ′′] ≤ rver[T ′]. Additionally, by
Proposition C.4, the anti-dependency T ′
RWx−−−→ T ′′ implies
that rver[T ′] < wver[T ′′]. Overall, we obtained a contradic-
tion.
Secondly, we consider the case when value , vinit. Ac-
cording to Figure 10, HB, RW andWR edges are added into
the graph. However, in this proof we do not consider the
new HB edges, since they cannot cause cycles invalidating
INV.4. For the same reason, we only consider WR-edges
originating from transactions. Let T
WRx−−−→ T ′ be the read
dependency added and let T ′
RWx−−−→ T ′′ be any of the new
anti-dependencies added by the graph update. We prove
by contradiction that neither of them causes a cycle in
(RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW).
The invariant INV.8(a) asserts that the value of the register
reg[x] previously stored in a local variable value is the
value written by the last transaction in WWx . From this
observation, it is easy to conclude that T is this transaction
at the moment (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′). By INV.8(b), ver[x] coincides
with the write version wver[T ]. Knowing that the condition
(7) holds, we conclude that so does wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′].
Also, by Proposition C.4, the anti-dependency T ′
RWx−−−→ T ′′
implies that rver[T ′] < wver[T ′′].
Adding edges T
WRx−−−→ T ′ or T ′ RWx−−−→ T ′′ may cause three
kinds of cycles: the ones containing exactly one of the two
edges, and the one containing both. We consider these cases
separately:
Case #1: T
WRx−−−→ T ′. Previously, we have shown that
wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] holds. Also, by INV.7(d),
rver[T ′] , ⊥ holds. Overall, both ¬(rver[T ′] <
wver[T ]) and rver[T ′] , ⊥ hold. Note that T ′ is not
visible and T is. When all of the aforementioned takes
place, the contra-positive of Proposition C.2 states
that there is no path T ′ RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T . Hence,
the edge T
WRx−−−→ T ′ alone does not cause a cycle in
RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW.
Case #2: T ′
RWx−−−→ T ′′. Previously, we have shown that
rver[T ′] < wver[T ′′] holds. Also, by INV.7(d),
rver[T ′] , ⊥ holds. Overall, both ¬(wver[T ′′] ≤
rver[T ′]) and rver[T ′] , ⊥ hold. Note thatT ′′ is visi-
ble andT ′ is not. When all of the aforementioned takes
place, the contra-positive of Proposition C.2 states
that there is no path T ′′ RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T ′. Hence,
the edge T ′
RWx−−−→ T ′′ alone does not cause a cycle in
RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW.
Case #3: T
WRx−−−→ T ′ RWx−−−→ T ′′. Previously, we have shown
that wver[T ] ≤ rver[T ′] < wver[T ′′] holds. Note that
T ′′ and T are both visible. As the contra-positive of
Proposition C.2 states, if wver[T ′′] < wver[T ] does
not hold, then there is no pathT ′′ RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T .
Hence, the edges T
WRx−−−→ T ′ RWx−−−→ T ′′ do not cause a
cycle in RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW.

Proposition C.10. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV, T ∈ txns(H ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of a graph update TXVIS(T ′), then
(s ′,H ′,G ′) satises INV.4.
Proof. Note the graph update TXVIS(T ′) occurs after line 50
in the transactionT ′, meaning that the following holds ofT ′
in (s,H ,G ):
• ∀(x , _) ∈ wset[T ′]. lock[x] = T ′;
• ∀(x , _) ∈ rset[T ′]. pv[T ′][x] = true.
The graph update TXVIS(T ′) adds the following new edges
into the opacity graph G = (N , vis,HB,WR,WW,RW) for
every register x such that (x , _) ∈ wset[T ′] holds:
• {n WWx−−−−→ T ′ | n ∈ N ∧n , T ′∧vis(n)∧writes(n,x , _)}
• {n RWx−−−→ T ′ | n ∈ N ∧ n , T ′ ∧ reads(n,x , _)}
The update also makes T ′ visible in (s ′,H ′,G ′). It is easy to
see that only new edges between transactions can invali-
date INV.4, since it asserts absence of cycles over transac-
tions only. As the new dependencies end in the same node
T ′, they will not appear in the same simple cycle. These
two observations together allow us to consider each edge
individually and prove that it does not create a cycle in
(RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW).
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WW-edges.We show that adding an edge T
WWx−−−−→ T ′ into
the opacity graph G preserves INV.4.
Note that lock[x] = T ′ and that T is such that vis(T ),
T , T ′ and writes(T ,x , _) all hold of (s,H ,G ); then from
INV.6(a) we infer that wver[T ] < wver[T ′]. The latter also
holds of (s ′,H ′,G ′), as the graph update does not change
write timestamps of transactions.
We demonstrated in Proposition C.8 that (s ′,H ′,G ′) satis-
es INV.5 and argued that it also satises INV.8. This enables
applying Proposition C.2 to (s ′,H ′,G ′). Note that vis(T ) and
vis(T ′) both hold of (s ′,H ′,G ′). The contra-positive of Propo-
sition C.2 asserts that vis(T ), vis(T ′) and wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
together imply that T ′ RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T does not hold,
meaning that adding the edge T
WWx−−−−→ T ′ into G does not
create cycles in RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW.
RW-edges. We show that adding the edge T
RWx−−−→ T ′ into
the opacity graph G preserves INV.4. We consider the triple
(s,H ,G ) of the state prior to the graph update and split the
proof in two cases depending on whether T is visible or not.
First, we consider the case when T is visible. By INV.8(c),
pv[T ][x] = true holds of (s,H ,G ). Also, recall that T ′
holds a lock on x . When that is the case, according to
INV.6(c), wver[T ] < wver[T ′] holds. The latter also holds
of (s ′,H ′,G ′), as the graph update does not change write
timestamps of transactions.
We demonstrated in Proposition C.8 that (s ′,H ′,G ′) satis-
es INV.5 and argued that it also satises INV.8. This enables
applying Proposition C.2 to (s ′,H ′,G ′). Note that vis(T ) and
vis(T ′) both hold of (s ′,H ′,G ′). The contra-positive of Propo-
sition C.2 asserts that vis(T ), vis(T ′) and wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
together imply that T ′ RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T does not hold,
meaning that adding the edge T
RWx−−−→ T ′ into G does not
create cycles in RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW.
We now return to the case when T is not visible. Recall
thatT ′ holds a lock on x . When that is the case, according to
INV.6(b), rver[T ] < wver[T ′] holds of (s,H ,G ). The latter
also holds of (s ′,H ′,G ′), as the graph update does not change
write timestamps of transactions.
We demonstrated in Proposition C.8 that (s ′,H ′,G ′) sat-
ises INV.5 and argued that it also satises INV.8. This
enables applying Proposition C.2 to (s ′,H ′,G ′). Note that
¬vis(T ) and vis(T ′) both hold of (s ′,H ′,G ′). Also, rver[T ] ,
⊥, since by INV.7(d) transaction satisfying reads(T ,x , _)
already has its read timestamp initialized. The contra-
positive of Proposition C.2 asserts that vis(T ′), ¬vis(T ) and
¬(wver[T ′] ≤ wver[T ] ∨ rver[T ] = ⊥) together imply
that T ′ RT∪WR∪WW∪RW−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→+ T does not hold, meaning that
adding the edge T
RWx−−−→ T ′ into G does not create cycles in
RT ∪ txWR ∪ txWW ∪ txRW. 
C.10 Preservation of INV.6
Proposition C.11. When (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV,T ∈ txns(H ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of execution of line 45 by T , if lock[x]
is held by some transaction T ′, then rver[T ] < wver[T ′].
Proof sketch. The transactionT post-validates its read from x
at line 45 simultaneously with loading the value of ver[x]. At
the previous line, the commit operation ofT stores the value
of lock[x] in a local variables locked. The post-validation is
successful only if ¬locked and ver[x] ≤ rver[T ]. Note that
this check has already been performed when T performed
a read operation from x . This way TL2 ensures that there
has been a moment between the execution of line 20 in the
read operation and line 45, at which both lock[x] = ⊥ and
ver[x] ≤ rver[T ] hold simultaneously. Let (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′)
correspond to that moment.
For convenience, we introduce a predicate PVP(T ,x ),
which holds of (s,H ,G ) whenever the following does:
reads(T ,x , _) holds, and if lock[x] is held by some trans-
action T ′, then rver[T ] < wver[T ′]. It is easy to see that
PVP(T ,x ) holds trivially of (s ′′,H ′′,G ′′), since lock[x] is not
held at that moment. We further demonstrate that PVP(T ,x )
is never invalidated by transitions and graph updates ofT or
by other threads. This allows us to conclude that PVP(T ,x )
holds of (s ′,H ′,G ′).
Note that once PVP(T ,x ) is established, it could only be
possibly invalidated by:
• a transition byT ′ at line 33 acquiring the lock lock[x];
• a transition by T ′ at line 40 setting the write times-
tamps wver[T ′] from⊤ to the incremented clock value.
However, both preserve PVP(T ,x ). Indeed, when the former
transition occurs, wver[T ′] = ⊤ holds. Since ⊤ is the max-
imal possible timestamp, rver[T ] < wver[T ′] holds then.
When the second transition occurs in a transaction T ′ hold-
ing a lock on x , by INV.7(b), we observe that rver[T ] <
clock + 1 and that wver[T ′] = clock + 1, which also allows
to conclude rver[T ] < wver[T ′]. 
Proposition C.12. If (s,H ,G ) ∈ INV, T ∈ txns(H ) and
(s ′,H ′,G ′) is a result of a graph update, then (s ′,H ′,G ′) sat-
ises INV.6.
Proof. Graph updates NTXREAD(_, _) and NTXWRITE(_, _)
do not aect the invariant, since it only asserts properties of
transactions. Thus, in this proof we consider the following
graph updates and transitions:
1. the graph update TXVIS(T ), which may enable the
premise of INV.6(a);
2. the graph update TXREAD(T ,x , _), which may enable
the premise of INV.6(b);
3. the transition by T at line 45 setting pv[T ][x] to true,
which may enable the premise of INV.6(c);
4. the transition by T ′ at line 33 acquiring the lock
lock[x], which may enable the premise of INV.6(a,b,c);
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5. the transition byT at line 11 setting the read timestamp
rver[T ] from ⊥ to the current clock value, which may
aect the implication of INV.6(b);
6. the transition by T (or T ′) at line 40 setting the write
timestamps wver[T ] (or wver[T ′]) from ⊤ to the incre-
mented clock value, which may aect the implication
of INV.6(a,b,c).
Firstly, we discuss a possibility when the graph update
TXVIS(T ) in a transaction T writing to x makes T visible,
when lock[x] = T ′ holds already. Note that TXVIS(T ) only
happens when T holds the lock on lock[x], meaning that
the possibility in discussion never arises.
Second, we consider a possibility when the graph update
TXREAD(T ,x ,v ) (or rather, the read response added into the
history) in a transaction T makes reads(T ,x ,v ) hold, when
lock[x] = T ′ holds already. In the proof of Proposition C.4,
we shown PAD(T ,x ,v ), meaning that the following holds of
T in this case:
• if T reads the initial value, then:
∀n′.writes(n′,x , _) ∧ ¬aborted(n′) =⇒
(n′ ∈ txns(H )) ∧ rver[T ] < wver[n′]
• if T reads the value written by a node n, then:
∀n′.writes(n′,x , _) ∧ ¬aborted(n′) ∧ ¬n′ WWx−−−−→ n =⇒
(n′ ∈ txns(H )) ∧ rver[T ] < wver[n′]
We further argue that premises of the two properties above
hold of T ′. Note that T ′ holds a lock on x . By INV.8(e), T ′ is
not completed (and, therefore, not aborted), writes to x and is
not followed inWWx by any other transaction. Let us show
by contradiction that it is also not followed inWWx by any
non-transactional node either. Let us assume that there is
a non-transactional n such that T ′
WWx−−−−→ n holds. By INV.1,
the history is DRF, meaning that eitherT ′ HB−−→ n or n HB−−→ T ′
must hold. However, the former contradicts INV.8(d) and the
latter contradicts INV.3. Hence, such node n does not exist.
Overall, we demonstrated thatwrites(T ′,x , _), ¬aborted(T ′)
and ∀n.¬T ′ WWx−−−−→ n all hold, hence, from PAD(T ,x ,v ) we
obtain rver[T ] < wver[T ′].
Third, we consider the transition by T at line 45 setting
pv[T ][x] to true, when lock[x] = T ′ holds already. By
Proposition C.11, rver[T ] < wver[T ′] holds in this case.
Forth, we consider a possibility of the transition by T ′ at
line 33 acquiring lock[x] and enabling the premise of either
of the invariants, which we consider separately. To this end,
we start with considering the case when writes(T ,x ) and
vis(T ) hold, andT ′ acquires lock[x].We need to demonstrate
that wver[T ] < wver[T ′]. By INV.7(e), wver[T ] , ⊤. How-
ever, at line 33, wver[T ′] = ⊤. Hence, wver[T ] < wver[T ′],
which concludes INV.6(a). Let us now consider the case when
reads(T ,x , _) holds, and T ′ acquires lock[x]. We need to
demonstrate that rver[T ] < wver[T ′]. By INV.7(b), rver[T ]
is smaller than the value of the global clock, so it cannot
be ⊤. Knowing that wver[T ′] = ⊤ holds, we get that so
does rver[T ] < wver[T ′], which concludes INV.6(b). We
now consider the case when pv[T ][x] holds, andT ′ acquires
lock[x]. We need to demonstrate that wver[T ] < wver[T ′].
By INV.7(e), if T post-validated at least one of its reads,
wver[T ] , ⊤. Knowing that at line 33, wver[T ′] = ⊤ holds,
we get that so does wver[T ] < wver[T ′], which concludes
INV.6(c).
Fifth, we consider a possibility of the transition by T at
line 11 aecting the implication of INV.6(b). We assume that
reads(T ,x , _) and lock[x] = T ′ both hold prior to the tran-
sition. By INV.7(d), rver[T ] , ⊥ then. Since the transition
by T at line 11 only happens when rver[T ] = ⊥, it cannot
possibly invalidate INV.6(b).
Finally, we consider a possibility of the transition by T or
T ′ at line 40 aecting the implication of INV.6(a, b, c). Let us
rst show that such transition in fact cannot happen in T .
For each of the invariants, we assume that its premise holds,
and that wver[T ] < wver[T ′] prior to the transition. This
means that wver[T ] , ⊤, since ⊤ is the maximal timestamp
value. Knowing that line 40 executes only when wver[T ] =
⊤, we conclude that it cannot invalidate INV.6. We now
consider line 40 changing the write timestamp wver[T ′] from
⊤ to (clock+1). For each of the invariants, we assume that
its premise holds. Let us show that wver[T ] < wver[T ′]
is preserved by the transition. As we have shown, when
the aforementioned inequality holds before the transition,
wver[T ] , ⊤. By INV.7(b), the value (clock+1) is greater
than every write timestamp distinct from⊤, such as wver[T ].
Hence, wver[T ] < wver[T ′] holds after the transition. We
now show that rver[T ] < wver[T ′] is preserved by the
transition. By INV.7(b), the value (clock+1) is greater than
every read timestamp, such as rver[T ]. Hence, rver[T ] <
wver[T ′] holds after the transition. 
